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Property
Property; abandoned vessels
Harbors and Navigation Code § 522 (amended).
AB 2806 (Filante); 1992 STAT. Ch. 168
Prior law provided that any vessel 1 upon publicly owned
submerged lands, salt marshes, or tidelands in an unseaworthy 2 or
dilapidated condition for a period longer than 100 days without a
watchman or other person in charge of the vessel, is abandoned
property and may be sold, destroyed, or otherwise disposed of.3
Chapter 168 instead provides that the property need only be in an
unseaworthy or dilapidated condition for a period of thirty days or
more to become abandoned property.'
STL
Property; advertising
Business and Professions Code § 5272 (amended); Civil Code
§§ 712, 713 (amended).
SB 1474 (Kopp); 1992 STAT. Ch. 773

1.
See CAL. HARB. & NAV. CODE § 21 (West 1978) (defining vessel and discussing an
owner's liability for vessels).
2.
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1539 (6th ed. 1990) (defining unseaworthy as a vessel
which is unable to withstand the perils of an ordinary voyage at sea).
3.
1981 Cal. Stat. ch. 278, sec. 1, at 1383 (enacting CAL- HARB. & NAy. CODE § 522)
(amended by Chapter 168); see 6 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFoRNIA LAW, Torts, § 1241 (9th
ed. 1988) (discussing abandoned vessels). See generally Mariners Bay Co. v. Department of Motor
Vehicles, 229 Cal. App. 3d 808, 280 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1991); Graf v. San Diego Unified Port Dist.,
205 Cal. App. 3d 1189, 252 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1988) (discussing the implications of detenmining that
a vessel is abandoned).
4.
CAL. HARB. & NAy. CODE § 522 (amended by Chapter 168); cf. ALASKA STAT. §
30.30.090 (1991) (providing for the removal of derelict vessels after 24 hours if the vessel meets
numerous specified conditions); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15-140c (West 1990) (providing for the
removal of abandoned vessels after 24 hours); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 823.11 (West 1991) (providing for
the immediate removal of abandoned and derelict vessels if numerous specified conditions are met).
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Under existing law, advertising display signs' used exclusively
to advertise the sale, lease, or exchange of the property on which the
display is placed are exempt from the provisions of the Outdoor
Advertising Act.2 Chapter 773 expands this exception to include
signs providing directions to the property for which the display is

placed, providing that the signs are not subject to the Highway
Beautification Act of 1965. 3
Existing law, permits the owner of real property or an agent of the
owner to display on the property, or on the property of another with
the other owner's consent, signs4 which advertise that the property
is for sale, directions to the property, and the owner's name,
telephone number, and address.5 The sign must be of reasonable
dimension and design and must be reasonably located. 6 Chapter 773
specifies that property owners may place such signs on multiple
properties and clarifies that such signs are exempt from the Outdoor
Advertising Act.7 Chapter 773 further provides the requirement that

1.
See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 5202 (West 1990) (defining advertising display as any
advertising structures or signs); see also id. § 5203 (West 1990) (defining advertising structure as any
structure of any kind or character erected or maintained for outdoor advertising purposes upon which
any poster, bill, printing, painting, or other advertisement of any kind whatsoever may be placed.)
2.
Id. § 5272(a) (amended by Chapter 773); see id. §§ 5200-5231(West 1990) (setting forth
the provisions of the Outdoor Advertising Act which provides the California Department of
Transportation with the authority to regulate the placement of signs); see also CAL. CODE REOS. tit.
4, §§ 2240-2519 (1990) (providing regulations for implementing the Outdoor Advertising Act); cf
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 13A-123 (West 1992); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 17, §§ 1104, 1108, 1114,
1122 (1983); IDAHO CODE § 40-1906 (1991); MiSs. CODE ANN. § 49-23-35 (1991); N.Y. HIGH. LAW
§ 88 (McKinney 1992); W. VA. CODE § 17-22-5 (1992) (establishing similar regulations on outdoor
advertising).
3.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 5272(a) (enacted by Chapter 773); see 23 U.S.C. § 131 (1988)
(setting forth the provisions of the Highway Beautification Act). The Highway Beautification Act was
enacted in order to protect the public interest in highways, to promote safety and recreational value
of public travel, and to preserve the natural beauty of the areas through which the highways travel.
Id.
4.
See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 5221 (West 1990) (defining sign as any card, cloth, paper,
metal, painted or wooden sign of any character placed for outdoor advertising purposes, on or to the
ground or any tree, wall, bush, rock, fence, building, structure, or thing, either privately or publicly
owned other than an advertising structure).
5.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 713 (amended by Chapter 773).
6.
Id.
7.
Id. §§ 712-713 (amended by Chapter 773). Chapter 773 was apparently amended in
response to complaints that the California Department of Transportation has overzealously enforced
the Outdoor Advertising Act against homeowners selling property. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITEE,
ComarrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1474, at 2 (Mar. 1992).
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the signs
do not adversely affect public safety, including traffic
8
safety.
SRM
Property; common interest developments
Civil Code § 1355.5 (new).
AB 1384 (Hauser); 1992 STAT. Ch. 124
Existing law provides that common interest development 1
declarations 2 may be amended pursuant to the governing

8.

CAL. Civ. CODE § 713(a) (amended by Chapter 773).

1.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1351 (c) (West Supp. 1992) (defining common interest development
to include community apartment projects, condominium projects, planned developments, or stock
cooperatives); id § 1351(d), (f), (k), (in) (West Supp. 1992) (defining community apartment project,

condominium project, planned development, and stock cooperative respectively). See generally
Trustees of Llewellyn Park v. Township of West Orange, 540 A.2d 868, 870 (NJ. Super. 1988)
(providing that the owner of a common interest development lot automatically acquires an equal and
undivided interest in the common facilities); DENIms P. ANDERSON AND GUtDoN H. BucK,
ATroRNEYs' & LENDER ' GUIDE TO COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT. CONDOMINnIS,
COOiPERATIvES, AN PLANNED CoMMuirrN s (1989) (presenting an overview of common interest law
as it relates to secured lending); WAYNE S. HYATr, CoNDoMINIUM AND HoMEOWNER ASSOCIATION
PRACInCE: COMMUNrrY ASSOCIATION LAW (2d ed. 1988) (discussing the trends and changes in the
substantive area of community associations law); ROBERT G. NATELSON, LAW OF PROPERTY OWNERS
AsSOcIATIONS (1989) (discussing the fundamentals, powers, laws, and litigation practices governing
property owners associations); G. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy, 75 CORNELL L. REV.
1 (1989) (analyzing and criticizing judicial intervention in residential associations' internal
regulations); Mathew T. Powers, Comment, Homeowner Association Standing in California: A
Proposalto Expand the Role of the Unit Owner, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 619 (1986) (discussing
legal trends relating to the ability of a homeowner's association to bring suit in California).
2.
See CAL Civ. CODE § 1351(h) (West Supp. 1992) (defiming declaration as a document
that contains the information required under California Civil Code § 1353). See generallyPreston Del
Norte Villas Ass'n v. Pepper Mill Apartments, 579 S.W.2d 267, 268 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978) (holding
that the declaration of a condominium project may reserve an easement for the benefit of the owners
of an adjoining property); HAw. REv. STAT. § 514A-11(11) (1991) (providing that an amendment
to the declaration of a condominium project may be done with a 75% vote of all the owners); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 503(a) (West 1992) (defining declaration as a duly recorded instrument); TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 81.002(5) (West 1992) (defining declaration as an instrument that establishes
property under a condominium regime).
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documents3 or as specified 4 by the Davis-Stirling Common Interest
Development Act.
Chapter 124 provides that the board of directors of the common
interest development association 6 is authorized to delete from the
governing documents, declarations which are unequivocally intended
to assist the developer 7 by providing access to common areas' for
the purpose of completing construction or marketing on the
development.9
DLR

3.
See CAL CIv. CODE § 1351(j) (West Supp. 1992) (defining governing documents): see
also CAL. CODE REos. tit. 10, § 2792.8 (1992) (describing contents of common interest
development's governing documents).
4.
See CAL Civ. CODE §§ 1355, 1356 (West Supp. 1992) (specifying that amendments must
be made pursuant to the governing documents, or by having at least 50% or more owner approval,
or by petitioning the superior court).
5.
Idi §§ 1355, 1356 (West Supp. 1992). The Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development
Act regulates the creation, operation, and alienation of interests in common interest developments.
i §§ 1350-1373 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992).
6.
See iad § 1351(a) (West Supp. 1992) (defining association as a nonprofit corporation or
unincorporated association created to manage a common interest development); i. §§ 1363, 1365.5
(West Supp. 1992) (discussing the powers of the associations and its governing body); CAL CODE
REGS. tit. 10, § 2792.19 (1992) (authorizing and regulating the election of an association governing
body); iU § 2792.21 (1992) (providing the powers and limitations given to the associations'
governing body).
7.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1954.26 (West Supp. 1992) (defining developer as a person
entering into an agreement with the redevelopment agency to develop specific commercial real estate
within a redevelopment area with the intent to acquire such property); CAL. GOvT CODE § 65917.5
(West Supp. 1992) (defining developer as the person having the right to make an application for
development approvals for the development or redevelopment of a commercial or industrial project).
8.
See CAL CIV. CODE § 1351(b) (West Supp. 1992) (defining common area as the entire
common interest development except for the separate interests in the development).
9.
Id § 1355.5 (enacted by Chapter 124). Chapter 124 specifies that the declarations may
only be deleted after the completion or termination of construction or the termination of marketing
of the development for sales, leases or other disposition. Id § 1355.5(a) (enacted by Chapter 124).
Chapter 124 also requires prior owner approval for such deletions, i § 1355.5(d) (enacted by
Chapter 124). Further, Chapter 124 requires the board of directors to mail by first class mail and at

least 30 days prior to amending the documents, to all separate interest owners the following: (1) A
copy of all amendments proposed to be adopted; and (2) a notice of time, date, and place of the open
meeting were the board will be considering the adoption of the amendments. L § 1355.5(c) (enacted
by Chapter 124). The decision by the board must be approved by a majority of the owners or a
quorum. Ma.§ 1355.5(d) (enacted by Chapter 124); see id (defining quorum).
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Property; common interest developments
Civil Code §§ 1363, 1366.1 (amended).
SB 1750 (Mello); 1992 STAT. Ch. 1332
Under existing law, recorded restrictions on the use or enjoyment
of common interest developments 1 are enforceable as equitable
servitudes.2 Chapter 1332 requires the board of directors of a
common interest development association to notify all members of
the association of the monetary sanctions which may be imposed
against the member in the event of a violation of the association's
governing documents.4
JME

1.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1351 (e) (West Supp. 1992) (defining common interest development
as a community apartment project, a planned development, a condominium project, or a stock

cooperative).
2.
Id. § 1354 (West Supp. 1992); see B.E. WrrKuN, SuMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Real
Property, § 493 (9th ed. 1985 & Supp. 1992) (defining equitable servitude, and explaining the
difference between it and a real covenant running with the land); see also Anderson v. Pacific
Avenue Inv. Co., 201 Cal. App. 2d 260, 263, 19 Cal. Rptr. 829, 831 (1962) (holding that for an
equitable servitude to be enforceable, the written instrument exchanged between the parties must
constitute the final expression of the parties' understanding); Werner v. Graham, 181 Cal. 174, 181,
183 P. 945, 947 (1919) (holding that a servitude will be strictly construed, and that any doubts as
to its existence shall be construed in favor of the free use of land); Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Phillips 774
(Court of Chancery, 1848) (holding that where a vendee purchases property with notice of the

restriction, the restriction may be enforced against him); Riley v. Bear Creek Planning Comm., 17
Cal. 3d 500, 507, 551 P.2d 1213, 1218, 131 Cal. Rptr. 381, 386 (1976) (holding the same). But see
RESTATEMIENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 539 cmt. d (1989) (stating that an illegal promise to restrict
the use of land is void); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 53, 782 (West 1987) (stating that religious or racially
motivated restrictions on the use of land are void). For other states' laws regulating common interest
developments, see, ALASKA STAT. § 34.08.540 (199 1) (explaining common interest developments and
providing for their enforcement); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47-217 (1991) (regulating common interest
developments); Nay. REv. STAT. § 116.2109 (1991) (providing the requirements of, and explaining
enforcement provisions of common interest developments); W. VA. CODE § 36B-3-1011 (1992)
(providing for the regulation of common interest developments).
3.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1363(h) (amended by Chapter 1332) (providing that notification
must be made by personal delivery or by first class mail).
4.
IcL Notice to the members only need be given if the board of directors adopts or has
adopted a policy of imposing monetary discipline on its members. Id.
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Property; eminent domain--public utilities

Code of Civil Procedure § 1235.193 (new); §§ 1240.650,
1245.250 (amended).
SB 1757 (Morgan); 1992 STAT. Ch. 812
Existing law provides that when the governing body of a public
entity' seeks to acquire property2 owned by a private entity in an
eminent domain action,3 a resolution of necessity 4 passed by the
public entity establishes conclusively that the property will be put to
a use more necessary5 than that of the owner of the property. 6

1.
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1245.210 (West 1982) (defining governing body of a local
public entity as the legislative body of the public entity).
2.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 654 (West 1982) (defining ownership of property).
3.
See CAL Civ. PRoc. CODE §§ 1230-1273 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992) (promulgating the
Eminent Domain Law); see also CAL CONST. art. 1, § 19 (declaring the right to take private property
for public use in an action of eminent domain); CAL CIrV. PROc. Code § 1263.310 (West 1982)
(requiring compensation for property taken in an action of eminent domain). The power to take land
in actions of eminent domain is conferred upon a number of public districts including, but not limited
to, fire protection districts (CAL. HEALT-H & SAFrY CODE § 13861 (West Supp. 1992)); recreational
park, park and open-space, and open space districts (CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 5542 (West 1984)); and
water districts (CAL. WATER CODE § 22456 (West 1984)).
4.
See CAL Civ. PRoc. CODE § 1245.220 (West 1982) (requiring adoption of a resolution
of necessity prior to commencement of an eminent domain proceeding); id § 1245.230 (West Supp.
1992) (prescribing contents of a resolution ofnecessity); id § 1245.235 (West Supp. 1992) (requiring
the governing body of the public entity attempting to acquire property by eminent domain
proceedings to provide property owners the opportunity to appear and be heard); i. § 1245.240 (West
1982) (requiring the governing body to adopt by a two-thirds majority vote a resolution of necessity
attendant to an eminent domain action); id § 1245.250 (amended by Chapter 812) (describing the
conclusive effect of resolution of necessity); cf City of Los Angeles v. Fiske, 117 Cal. App. 2d 167,
171, 255 P.2d 445, 449 (1953) (holding a declaration within an ordinance conclusive evidence of
public necessity); 52 Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. 56, 57 (1969) (expressing the opinion that a two-thirds
majority vote on a resolution is conclusive of the public good).
5.
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1240.650 (amended by Chapter 812) (defining the conditions
under which a particular use to which condemned land is put is presumed more necessary than that
to which it was previously dedicated); City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 69, 646
P.2d 835, 840, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673, 679 (1982) (holding that public use may concern the whole
community, but that it is not essential that all of the community benefit directly from the use); Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Parachini, 29 Cal. App. 3d 159, 164, 105 Cal. Rptr. 477,480 (1972) (holding that
the trial court may examine future needs as well as present needs in determining the propriety of a
claim of necessity); Stratford Irrigation Dist. v. Empire Water Co., 44 Cal. App. 2d 61, 67, 111 P.2d
957, 961 (1941) (defining the limitations of eminent domain actions in terms of the statement of
public use by the Legislature).
6.
CAL CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1240.250, 1240.650 (amended by Chapter 812).
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Chapter 812 provides that where private utility 7 property is
appropriated by a public electric,' gas,9 or water" entity for similar
use, a resolution of necessity establishes only a rebuttable
presumption of a more necessary use.12
SEA
Property; land surveying
Business and Professions Code §§ 8741, 8773.2 (amended);
Government Code §§ 66471, 66472 (amended).
AB 1268 (Mays); 1992 STAT. Ch. 634

7.
See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 216 (West 1975) (including as a public utility a gas,
electrical, telephone, telegraph, water, sewer, and heat corporation, where the service is performed
for, or the commodity is delivered to, the public or any portion thereof).
8.
See id. § 218 (West Supp. 1992) (defining electrical corporation).
9.
See id § 222 (West Supp. 1992) (defining gas corporation).
10.
See id § 241 (West Supp. 1992) (defining water corporation).
11.
See CAL EVID. CODE § 605 (West Supp. 1992) (defining presumption affecting the burden
of proof).
12.
CAL Civ. PROc. CODE §§ 1240.650, 1245.250 (amended by Chapter 812). Chapter 812
brings standards of presumption for eminent domain actions by public utilities into conformity with
private and public use eminent domain actions. Id § 1240.640 (West 1982); see FMINENT DOMAIN
- SPECIAL RuLES FOR TAxING PRrVATE PUBLIc UTm.TY PROPERTY, NOTES OF THE SENATE
COMMIrEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1757, at 3 (May 5, 1992) (discussing

generally the nature of challenges to a rebuttable presumption of more necessary use in eminent
domain actions by public utilities). Other states are varied in requirements for a showing of necessity
or best use where the condemned property is to be put to the same use. See ALA. CODE § 18-la-93
(1991) (providing for hearings on preliminary objections where property is taken for the same use);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 32-4-502, 32-9-161 (West 1990) (reserving to a district the power of
eminent domain for the condemnation of private property necessary for any object or purpose of the
district, whether such property is to be put to the same use); NEv. REv. STAT. § 271.065 (1965)
(granting to a municipality the authority to exercise the power of eminent domain by passage of
resolution, which shall beprimafacieevidence of necessity, for the condemnation of private property
for public use, whether such property will be devoted to the same use); id § 349.213 (1985)
(granting to a commission the authority to exercise the power of eminent domain by passage of
resolution, which shall be primafacie evidence of necessity); id § 350.569 (1985) (granting to a
municipality the authority to exercise the power of eminent domain by passage of ordinance, which
shall be primafacie evidence of necessity); VA. CODE ANN. § 25-46.7 (Michie 1991) (requiring a
petition for condemnation which shall contain, in addition to other enumerated elements, the authority
for the taking, the necessity for the work or improvements to be made, and the public uses for which
the property is to be taken).
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Existing law provides for examination' and licensure2 of land
surveyors. 3 Chapter 634 revises the examination procedure to require
an applicant to be thoroughly familiar with the principles of real
property relating to boundaries and conveyancing, in addition to the
procedures and rules governing the survey of public lands.4
Under existing law, licensed land surveyors are required to file a
written record5 for every corner established by public land survey.6
Chapter 634 mandates that such a record be submitted to the county
surveyor or engineer be examined for compliance with specified
laws,7 endorsed, and filed or returned for resubmission.8
Existing law also provides that a final subdivision or parcel map9
may be amended"0 by an amending map or certificate" and filed

1.
See CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 8741 (amended by Chapter 634) (establishing the
requirement of an examination of land surveyors). The exam consists of two divisions. MaiThe frst
division of the exam tests the applicant's fundamental knowledge of surveying, mathematics and
basic science. lI The second division tests the applicant's ability to apply his or her knowledge and
experience and to assume responsible charge in the professional practice of land surveying. Id.
2.
See id §§ 8740-8753 (West 1975 & Supp. 1992) (defining the process for the issuance
of land surveyor licenses); cf. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 12-25-214 (1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 472.013
(1991), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, para. 3261 (1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 2592 (1991)
(establishing licensure of land surveyors).
3.
CAL. Bus. & PRoF. CoDE § 8741 (amended by Chapter 634); see id § 8701 (West Supp.
1992) (defining professional land surveyor); see also ri § 8708 (West Supp. 1992) (providing
licensing requirements); i § 8725 (West Supp. 1992) (requiring a license for the practice of
professional land surveying); i § 8726 (West Supp. 1992) (defining land surveying); CAL. CODE
REos. tit. 2, § 599.922 (1992) (establishing fees for professional land surveying licenses).
4.
CAL- Bus. & PROF. CODE § 8741 (b) (amended by Chapter 634). The purpose of this bill
is to clean up land surveyor law in accordance with recommendations from the Land Surveyor's
Association. Telephone interview with Ms. Julia King, Consultant to Assemblyman Tom Mays,
September 15, 1992 (notes on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
5.
See Bus. & PROF. CODE § 8764 (West Supp. 1992) (defining the required contents of
records of the establishment of comers).
6.
Id § 8773.2 (amended by Chapter 634); see id § 8773.4 (West Supp. 1992) (requiring
filing of corner record with county surveyor); id § 8773.2 (amended by Chapter 634) (providing for
the submission of a comer record with the county surveyor); CAL. CODE REoS. tit. 16, § 464 (1992)
(defining the required contents of a comer record); cf CoLO. REv. STAr. § 38-50-107 (1991); IND.
CODE ANN. § 36-2-12-11 (West 1991) (defining the recordation of comer records).
7.
See CAL. Bus. & PRoF. CODE §§ 8765, 8773, 8773.1, 8773.4 (West 1975 & Supp. 1992)
(establishing requirements with which a filed comer record must comply when recorded).
8.
Id § 8773.2 (amended by Chapter 634).
9.
See CAL. GOVT CODE §§ 66433-66462.5 (West 1983 & Supp. 1992) (authorizing final
subdivision maps); see also id. §§ 66444-66450 (West 1983 & Supp. 1992) (authorizing parcel

maps).
10.
See id § 66469-66472.1 (West 1983 & Supp. 1992) (providing for correction and
amendment of maps).
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in the office of the county recorder.12 Chapter 634 provides that the
examination and certification shall either be by the city surveyor or
engineer if the subdivision is in the city.13 Chapter 634 further
provides that the certified amending map or certificate of correction
may, instead of being filed, be recorded with the county recorder.14
STL
Property; land use
Government Code §§ 65858, 66007 (amended).
AB 1262 (Chacon); 1992 STAT. Ch. 231
Existing law permits a city' or county2 to adopt an interim
ordinance3 prohibiting uses which may be in conflict with a general
plan,4 specific plan, 5 or zoning' proposal.7 The interim ordinance
11.
See kL § 66442 (West Supp. 1992) (defining certificate to be filed with the county
engineer).
12.
IL § 66470 (West Supp. 1992); see id. § 66471 (amended by Chapter 634) (requiring
examination of the amending map or certificate).
13.
Id. § 66471(a) (amended by Chapter 634).
14.
Id § 66472 (amended by Chapter 634). Note that upon such filing or recordation the
names shall be indexed and the appropriate tract designation shown on the amending map or
certificate of correction in the general index and map index respectively. Id The original map shall
be deemed be have been corrected, and will impart constructive notice of all such corrections in the
same manner as the original map. Id

1.
See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 34000-45345 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992) (establishing the
government of cities).
2.
See id §§ 23000-33017 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992) (establishing the government of

counties).
3.
See U § 65858 (amended by Chapter 231) (authorizing the adoption of interim ordinances
and urgency measures); id. § 60004 (West 1983) (defining ordinance); see also iU. § 37100 (West
1988) (providing that cities may not adopt ordinances which conflict with the constitution or laws
of the State of California or the United States). An interim ordinance remains in effect for no longer
than 45 days. Id. § 65858 (amended by Chapter 231).
4.
See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 37853 (West 1973) (defining general plan); see CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 65300 (West 1992) (requiring each city and each county to adopt a general plan); see
id § 65302 (West 1983) (describing the required elements which must be included in a general plan);
see also iUt § 65400 (West Supp. 1992) (specifying the duties of the planning agency after adoption
of a general plan); Garat v. City of Riverside, 2 Cal. App. 4th 259, 293, 3 Cal. Rptr. 504, 539 (1991)
(discussing the requirements for an adequate general plan). See generally James Longtin, Longtin's
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may not be adopted unless there is a current and immediate threat to
the public health, safety, or welfare.8 Chapter 231 prohibits a
legislative body from adopting or extending an interim ordinance
which prohibits uses unless the ordinance contains a finding that
there is a current and immediate threat to public health, safety, and
welfare. 9 Chapter 231 requires that the prohibited uses pose an
identical threat to public health, safety, and welfare as that threat to
public health, safety, and welfare which is contained in the interim
ordinance.'"

STL

California Land Use, §§ 6.03-6.63 (Cal. Continuing Educ. Bar Supp. 1992) (discussing general plan
adoption in California); CuRTiN, Er AL, PRACTICE UNDER THE SUBDMSION MAP ACT (Cal.
Continuing Educ. Bar 1982) (discussing land use practice); CURTIN AND MERRITr, CALIFORNIA
SUBDIVISION MAP ACT (Cal. Continuing Educ. Bar 1991) (discussing California land us-,and the
Subdivision Map Act).
5.
See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65451 (West Supp. 1992) (specifying the required contents of
a specific plan); iaL § 65450 (West Supp. 1992) (stating the purpose of a specific plan); id. § 65453
(West Supp. 1992) (indicating the procedures for adoption of a specific plan).
6.
See CAL. PuB. Rns. CODE § 30122 (West Supp. 1992) (defining zoning ordinance); see
also CAL GOV'T CODE § 53090 (West 1992) (defining building ordinance).
7.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65858 (amended by Chapter 231); cf Wis. STAT. ANN. § 59.97
(West 1990); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23B, § 22 (1991) (providing for adoption of a general plan).
8.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65858(c) (amended by Chapter231). See generally Richard Briffault,
Our Localism: PartI - The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1, 38 (1990)
(discussing ordinances which affect public health, welfare and safety); Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2892 (1992) (discussing interference with property rights
generally).
9.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65858(c) (amended by Chapter 231).
10.
Id There must be a nexus between the finding of health, safety, and welfare and the
prohibition of uses contained in the interim ordinance. Id
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Property; lis pendens--real property claims
Code of Civil Procedure §§ 409, 409.1,409.2, 409.3, 409.4,
409.5, 409.55, 409.6,409.7,409.8,409.9 (repealed); §§ 405,
405.5, 405.7, 405.8 (repealed and new); §§ 405.1,405.2,
405.3, 405.4,405.6,405.20,405.21,405.22,405.23,405.24,
405.30, 405.31, 405.32, 405.33, 405.34, 405.35, 405.36,
405.37, 405.38, 405.39, 405.50, 405.60, 405.61 (new).
AB 3620 (Epple); 1992 STAT. Ch. 883
Existing law permits a party who is asserting a real property2
claim' to file a notice of the pendency of an action (lis pendens).
Existing law establishes that the recording3 of the lis pendens
constitutes constructive notice of a pending claim regarding the real
property.4 Chapter 883 revises the definition of "real property claim"

1.
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 405.4 (enacted by Chapter 883) (defining real property claim
as a cause of action which affects title to, or the right to possession of, specific real property, or the
use of an easement identified in the pleading, other than an easement obtained by any regulated
public utility); see also Parker v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. App. 3d 397, 399, 88 Cal. Rptr. 352, 353
(1970) (holding that filing of a lis pendens is ineffective if the action is one concerning personal
property). See generally Valerie L. Castle, After Malcolm v. Superior Court and Peery v. Superior
Court: A Due ProcessAnalysis of CaliforniaLis Pendens,70 CAL. L. REv. 909, 909 (1982) (stating
that although the lis pendens serves the useful purpose of notifying potential purchasers of property
of pending lawsuits, it is subject to abuse, and effectively prevents alienation of the property until
the judgment in the underlying action has become final).
2.
CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 405.20 (enacted by Chapter 883) (existing law was formerly
contained in California Civil Procedure Code § 409, which was repealed by Chapter 883 and replaced
with § 405.20).
3.
See iL (stating that the notice must be recorded in the office of the recorder of each
county where the real property is located, and that the notice must include the names of all parties
to the action and a description of the property); id §§ 405.21, 405.22 (enacted by Chapter 883)
(stating the requirements necessary for proper recordation and service of a notice of pendency of
action); Id § 405.23 (enacted by Chapter 883) (providing that any notice of pendency of action is
void and invalid as to any adverse party or owner of record notice to subsequent purchasers,
encumbrancers, or transferees of the property unless the requirements of § 405.22 are met, and that
proof of service in the form and content specified in § 1013(a) has been recorded with the lis
pendens); see also id. § 1013 (West 1990) (defining the procedure for service by mail).
4.
Xa.§ 405.24 (enacted by Chapter 883) (existing law was formerly contained in California
Civil Procedure Code § 409, which was repealed by Chapter 883 and replaced with § 405.24); see
id. § 405.24 (enacted by Chapter 883) (specifying that constructive notice will only affect the
property of named parties, and will not extend to fictitiously named "Doer parties); see also Putnam
Sand & Gravel Co. v. Albers, 14 Cal. App. 3d 722, 725, 92 Cal. Rptr. 636, 638 (1971) (holding that
after filing a notice of lis pendens, the purchaser or encumbrancer has constructive notice of it, and
subsequent judgment in the action is conclusive against them).
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to include a cause of action in a pleading which would, if meritorious,
affect the use of an easement identified in the pleading.'
Prior law provided that a lis pendens could be expunged while the
action involving the real property was still pending if the party who
had filed the lis pendens failed to persuade the trial court that the
action was commenced for a proper purpose and in good faith.6
Chapter 883 specifies instead that expungement may be soughtif the
court finds either that the underlying action does not contain a real
property claim, or that the claimant cannot establish by a
preponderance of the evidence probable validity3 of the real property
claim.9 Chapter 883 provides that the court may permit evidence to
5.
CAL. CIrV. PRoc. CODE § 405.4(b) (enacted by Chapter 883). The definition of a real
property claim includes all easements except those obtained because of a statute by any regulated
public utility. I
6.
1991 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 112, sec. 1, at 566 (West) (amending CAL CIV. PROc. CODE
§ 409.1); see Malcolm v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d 518, 529, 629, P.2d 495, 501, 174 Cal. Rptr.
694, 700 (198 1) (holding that the declarations and affidavits of the plaintiff which set forth that the
action was commenced for a proper purpose and good faith were sufficient to meet the burden of
proving the propriety ofa lis pendens since the alleged weakness of the claim and the likelihood that
the plaintiff would prevail after trial were not material in determining whether to expunge tie lis
pendens); Peery v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d 837, 840, 844-45, 633 P.2d 198, 200, 203, 176 Cal.
Rptr. 533, 535, 538 (1981) (recognizing the requirement of good faith and proper purpose on appeal
as well as at the inception of the suit, and holding that in a post-trial expungement hearing, conducted
while the appeal was pending in the underlying action, the court could consider the merits only to
determine if the plaintiff could present an issue which would be at least debatable on appeal); of.
N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. § 6514(b) (McKinney 1980) (stating a court may cancel a notice of
pendency, if the plaintiff has not commenced or prosecuted the action in good faith).
7.
See CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 405.30 (enacted by Chapter 883) (stating that at any time
after the lis pendens has been recorded, any intervenor with an interest in the real property may file
a motion with the court where the action is pending to expunge the lis pendens).
8.
Id § 405.3 (enacted by Chapter 883) (defiming probable validity as more likely than not
that the claimant will obtain a judgment against the defendant on the claim).
9.
Id § 405.31 (enacted by Chapter 883); id § 405.32 (enacted by Chapter 883); see id. §§
405.31, 405.32 (enacted by Chapter 883) (stating that the court cannot order an undertaking to be
given as a condition of expunging the notice where the claimant cannot establish that the underlying
case contains a real property claim or fails to establish the probable validity of the claim). According
to the Real Property Law Section of the State Bar, this bill will disapprove cases such as Malcolm
v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d 518, 629 P.2d 495 (1981), and Peery v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d 337,
633 P.2d 198, 176 Cal. Rptr. 533 (1981) which have held that the court may not review the merits
of the underlying case on a motion to expunge, and will allow courts to make factual determinations
as to whether the case involves a real property claim and whether the claimant is likely to succeed.
ASSEMBLY CoMMrE oN JUDIcIARY, CoMMITrE ANALYSIS oF AB 3620, at 4 (Apr. 29, 1992); see
id at 4 (referencing the Real Property Law Section of the State Bar which contends that Malcoln
v. SuperiorCourtmisconstrues the lis pendens statutes by not allowing expungement if the pleadings
are technically proper, regardless of whether the claim had factual merit); Castle, supra note 1, at
928-29 (stating that existing law, which only considers the merits of the underlying claim in a
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be received and provide for discovery in determining whether the
underlying case involves a real property claim or whether the claim
has probable validity.'" Under Chapter 883, expungement may also
be sought if the court finds that the real property claim has probable
validity, but that an undertaking 11 will provide adequate relief for
the claimant. 2 The expungement order will be conditioned on the
giving of a sufficient undertaking to indemnify the claimant for all
damages proximately resulting from the expungement, which the
claimant may incur if the claimant prevails on the real property
3
claim.'
Existing law permits the court, by the motion of any party with
an interest in the property, to require the claimant to give the moving
party an undertaking as a condition of maintaining the notice in the
record title regardless of whether a motion to expunge has been

rudimentary fashion, and looks to the subjective intent of the plaintiff, is constitutionally inadequate;
and proposing a new lis pendens statute which would, among other things, require that the party
filing the notice show that the action is probably valid, rather than showing it was commenced in
good faith); see also Shannon v. Crouch, 645 S.W.2d 204,204 (Mo. 1983) (holding that cancellation
of a validly entered Us pendens could be based only upon specific grounds stated within the current
Us pendens statute); In re Sabatino, 393 N.Y.S.2d 671, 673 (1977) (stating that because his pendens
is a provisional remedy and is viewed as an extraordinary privilege, courts have demanded strict
compliance with the statutory requirements); Ratick v. Scalo, 345 A.2d 26,28 (Conn. 1974) (holding
that the lis pendens could only be released as authorized by statute).
10.
CAL. Ctv. PRoc. CODE § 405.30 (enacted by chapter 883); see Hilberg v. Superior Court,
215 Cal. App. 3d 539, 541, 263 Cal. Rptr. 675, 676 (1989) (holding that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying a motion to expunge a lis pendens without giving due consideration to evidence
suggesting that there was no merit in the underlying complaint seeking specific performance of a
contract to sell real property).
11.
See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1526 (6th ed. 1990) (defining undertaking as a promise
given in the course of legal proceedings by a party or his counsel, generally as a condition to
obtaining some concession from the court or the opposite party; a promise or security in any form).
12.
CAL. Cry. PRoc. CODE § 405.33 (enacted by Chapter 883); see Trapasso v. Superior
Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 561, 568, 140 Cal. Rptr. 820, 824 (1977) (holding that a trial court acted
within its discretion in expunging a lis pendens when a statutory undertaking in the amount of
$50,000 was posted as security); Empfield v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d 105, 107, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 375, 377 (1973) (holding that an undertaking to indemnify the buyers of real property against
any damages they might incur if a lis pendens was expunged was deemed adequate relief, and
therefore a refusal by the trial court to expunge the notice was deemed an abuse of discretion); cf.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & 1. § 6515 (McKinney 1980) (stating that the court may cancel a notice of
pendency if the moving party gives an undertaking, and the court finds that the undertaking secures
adequate relief to the plaintiff); TEx. PRoP. CODE ANN. § 12.008(a) (West 1984) (stating that the
court may cancel the lis pendens if it determines that the party seeking affirmative relief can be
adequately protected by the giving of an undertaking).
13.
CAL. Crv. PRoc. CODE § 405.33 (enacted by Chapter 883).
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filed. 14 Chapter 883 provides that the court must set a return date for
the claimant to show compliance with its order requiring an
undertaking. 15 Chapter 883 states that if the claimant does not show
compliance on the return date, the court will order the lis pendens
16
expunged.

CLR
Property; mobile home parks--recreational vehicles
Civil Code §§ 798, 798.3 (amended).
SB 1655 (Craven); 1992 STAT. Ch. 958
Prior law narrowly defined mobilehomes' so as to exclude
recreational vehicles, 2 commercial coaches, 3 and manufactured
homes less than a specified size4 from the Mobilehome Residency
Law.5 Under prior law, articles of the Mobilehome Residency Law

14.
15.
16.

Id § 405.34 (enacted by chapter 883).
Id
Id.

1.
See 1982 Cal. Stat. ch. 419, sec. 1, at 1770 (amending CAL. Civ. CODE § 798.3) (amended
by Chapter 958) (defining mobilehome as a structure designed for human habitation and for being

moved on a highway). The statute limited mobilehomes to include a manufactured home, but
excluded recreational vehicles and commercial coaches. lId; see also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 18007 (West 1984) (defining manufactured homes); id § 18008 (West Supp. 1992) (defining
mobilehomes); CAL VEH. CODE § 635 (West 1987) (including park trailers in the definition of trailer
coaches).
2.
See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 18010 (West 1984) (defming a recreational vehicle
as being designed for human habitation and containing less than 320 square feet of internal living
room area).

3.
See id § 18001.8 (West 1984) (defining commercial coach, including trailer coaches, as
a transportable structure designed and equipped for human occupancy).
4.
See id. § 18007 (West Supp. 1992) (delineating minimum dimensions of eight feet in
width and forty feet in length and total square footage of 320 as being necessary for consideration
as a manufactured home).
5.
1978 Cal. Stat. ch. 1035, sec. 4, at 3194 (enacting CAL CIV. CODE § 798) (amended by
Chapter 958). Section 798, as enacted, limited the Mobilehome Residency Law to mobilehomes that
require permits to be moved on a street or highway. Id. See generally CAL CIV. CODE §§ 798-799
(West 1982 & Supp. 1992) (codifying the Mobilehome Residency Law). A number of state statutes
place no particular requirements with respect to minimum sizes for mobilehomes. See FLA. STAT.
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pertaining to termination of tenancy by management 6 did not apply
to owners of trailer coaches, mobilehomes less than 320 square feet
in area or smaller than eight feet wide and forty feet long, or
recreational vehicles. 7 Under Chapter 958, trailers, including
mobilehomes less than 320 square feet and other defined recreational
vehicles located in mobilehome parks under rental agreements for
nine or more months shall be categorized as mobilehomes and subject
to the provisions of the Mobilehome Residency Law.8
SEA

ANN. § 320.822 (West 1990) (limiting travel trailers to 320 square feet and park trailers to 400 square
feet, but having no minimum size requirement); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-1-7-2 (Burns 1992) (defiing
mobilehome without regard to size); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10107 (1992) (defining mobilehome
as a transportable single family dwelling without regard to size); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-20-1 (1992)
(defining a park trailer as a vehicle designed as living quarters, mounted on wheels, with a gross
trailer area of not more than 400 square feet); itd § 57-16-3 (1992) (defining mobilehome as a
transportable structure without regard to size); V.I. CODE ANN. fit. 29, § 225 (1991) (defining
mobilehome as a transportable unit constructed for sleeping purposes). However, other states specify
minimum sizes for mobilehomes or categorize them as recreational vehicles or other equivalents. S.D.
CODIED LAws ANN. § 43-31-2 (1992) (defining mobilehomes as vehicles without motive power
capable of being made habitable and which are larger than two hundred and forty square feet); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 218.10 (1991) (defining mobilehome as a vehicle intended to be used for human
habitation and not exceeding or being shorter than statutory limits for length).
6.
See CAi. Civ. CODE § 798.55 (West Supp. 1992) (imposing limitations on the power of
management or park owners to terminate the tenancy of a mobilehome owner); id. § 798.56 (West
Supp. 1992) (enumerating the exclusive reasons for which management may terminate a tenancy).
7.
1978 Cal. Stat. ch. 1035, sec. 4, at 3194 (enacting CAL. CIV. CODE § 798) (amended by
Chapter 958); see "Trailer"Rights under the Mobilehome Residency Law & SB 1655: Hearing on
SB 1655 Before the Senate Select Committee on Mobilehomes, at ii (Mar. 16, 1992) [hereinafter
Hearings on SB 1655] (noting treatment of tenants in mobilehomes smaller than 320 square feet as
conventional apartment tenants who do not benefit from the Mobilehome Residency Law's
requirement of 60 days notice and cause in an eviction proceeding). It was the opinion of Legislative
Counsel that owners of mobilehomes smaller than 320 square feet are not protected by the
Mobilehome Residency Law. Id. at vi. Cf MicH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 125.2328a (West Supp. 1992)
(proscribing refusing to allow a mobile home to remain on-site based on age or size). See generally
F. Scott Milligan, Property Law - Covenants - Restrictions Against Mobile Homes, 55 TENN. L.
REv. 543 (1988) (discussing efforts to prohibit the placing of all mobilehomes, irrespective of size,
in areas zoned residential or which permitted the placing of modular homes).
8.
CAL CIV. CODE § 798.3 (amended by Chapter 958); see Hearingson SB 1655, supranote
7, at vi (presuming that trailer coaches and recreational vehicles designated as mobilehomes will
benefit from limitations imposed on mobilehome park owners or managers with regard to termination
of tenancy).
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Property; mobilehomes--rent control
Civil Code § 798.49 (new); §§ 798.32, 798.41 (amended).
SB 1365 (Leslie); 1992 STAT. Ch. 338
Under existing Mobilehome Residency Law, I a homeowner2
may not be charged authorized fees3 for services actually rendered
which are not in the standard rental agreement 4 without proper
notice.5 Existing law additionally states that mobilehome park6
management may bill a homeowner separately for utility services7
supplied for spaces in the park.' Chapter 338 requires that those fees
be separately stated on a monthly or periodic billing to the
homeowner. 9
Under existing law, local government may limit the maximum
rent that may be charged a tenant unless there is a specified
exception."1 Chapter 338 permits mobilehome management to
1.
See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 798-799.6 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992) (establishing the
Mobilehome Residency Law); see RONALD S. JAVOR & BENJAMIN L. SUSSMAN, CALIFORNIA
RESImIAL LANDLORD-TENANT PRACTICE § 8.2 (1986) (Cal. Continuing Edue. Bar) (defining
Mobilehome Residency Law as California Civil Code §§ 798 through 799.6).
2.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 798.9 (West Supp. 1992) (defining a homeowner as a person who
has a tenancy in a mobilehome park under a rental agreement).
3.
See id. § 798.31 (West Supp. 1992) (stating authorized fees to be rent, utilities, and
incidental reasonable charges for services actually rendered).
4.
See id. § 798.8 (West Supp. 1992) (defiming rental agreement); i& § 798.15 (West Supp.
1992) (listing required contents of the rental agreement).
5.
1, § 798.32 (amended by Chapter 338).
6.
See CAL. HEALTH & SAFF'Y CODE § 18214 (West Supp. 1992) (defiming mobilehome
park).
7.
See CAL. CIv. CODE. § 798.41 (a) (West Supp. 1992) (defining utility services to include
natural gas or liquid propane gas, electricity, water, cable television, garbage or refuse service, and
sewer service).
8.
id
9.
Id § 798.32(b) (amended by Chapter 338). Fees or charges which are amortized for a
specified period or which have a limited duration must include the expiration date on the initial notice
and each subsequent billing to the homeowner. Id; see BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 83 (6th ed. 1990)
(defiming amortization).
10.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 798.17 (West Supp. 1992). Rental agreements are exempt from any
ordinance, rule, or regulation or initiative measure adopted by any local government entity which
establishes a maximum rent if the agreement: (1) Is more than twelve months in duration; (2) is
entered into between the management and the homeowner for the personal and actual residence of
the homeowner, (3) provides that the homeowner is given at least thirty days from the day the rental
agreement is frst offered to the homeowner to accept or reject the rental agreement; and (4) provides
that the homeowner can void the agreement by notifying the management in writing within seventy-
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separately charge a homeowner for certain fees, charges, or
assessments imposed by local government.
DCHIV
Property; mobilehomes--termination of tenancy
Civil Code §§ 798.55, 798.56a (amended).
AB 2715 (Chacon); 1992 STAT. Ch. 835
Existing law provides that management' of a mobilehome2 park
may only terminate or refuse to renew a tenancy under specified
conditions.3 Additionally, existing law requires the management of

two hours of the execution of the agreement. IAt; Pennel v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 13-14
(holding that a rent control ordinance was constitutional on its face); Vega v. City of West
Hollywood, 223 Cal. App. 3d 1342, 1351, 273 Cal. Rptr. 243, 248 (1990) (stating that if the rents
reflect general market conditions, the maximum rent ordinance is enforceable).
11.
CAL Civ. CODE § 798.49 (enacted by Chapter 338). The fees, charges, and assessments

include those newly imposed by the city or the county, increased by the city or the county, and
imposed or increased pursuant to any state or locally mandated program relating to housing in the
Health and Safety Code. Id. § 798.49(a)(1)-(3) (enacted by Chapter 338). Chapter 338 further
provides that those separately charged fees, assessments, or other charges must be separately stated
on any billing to the homeowner. IAL § 798.49(d) (enacted by Chapter 338); see iU. (mandating that
separately billed fees, assessments or other charges be considered when rental adjustments are made);
i § 798.49(a)(1) (enacted by Chapter 338) (providing that § 798.49 will become effective on or after
January 1, 1993); cf.N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 233 (g)(1) (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1992) (providing
that all fees, charges, or assessments must be reasonably related to services rendered); TEx. REv. Civ.
STAT. ANN. Art. 1446d § 2(c) (West 1980 & Supp. 1992) (providing that the mobilehome park owner
may install submetering equipment for electricity in order to allocate the cost to each individual);
People ex. rel. Higgins v. Leier, 564 N.Y.S.2d 539, 541 (1990) (holding that New York's statutory
prohibition against certain fees does not allow a park owner to charge for real estate taxes).

1.
See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 18603 (West 1992) (setting forth the duties of
mobilehome park management).
2.
See id. § 18008 (West Supp. 1992) (defining mobilehome as a structure transportable
under permit in one or more sections, designed and equipped to contain not more than two dwelling
units to be used with or without a foundation system, a structure transportable under permit in one
or more sections, designed to be used with a foundation system).
3.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 798.56 (West Supp. 1992). The conditions which justify termination
or refusal to renew a tenancy include the following: (1) Failure of homeowner to comply with a local
ordinance or state law or regulation relating to mobilehomes; (2) conduct which constitutes a
substantial annoyance to the other residents or homeowners; (3) conviction of prostitution or a felony
controlled substance offence when the act is committed anywhere on the premises of the park; (4)
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the park to notify the legal owner,4 each junior lienholder, 5 and the
registered owner of such termination or refusal to renew. 6 Under
Chapter 835, if the homeowner fails to pay rent due within three days
of receipt of the original notice, notice of termination must again be
sent to the legal owner, junior lienholder, and registered owner within
ten days of the original notice sent to the homeowner.7 Chapter 835
further provides for the reimbursement of reasonable attorney's fees
and costs incurred by the management to evict the homeowner.8
JME

failure to comply with reasonable park rules pertaining to the rental agreement; (5) nonpayment of
rent; (6) condemnation of the park, (7) change of use of the park. Id, see People v. McKnle, 25 Cal.
3d 626, 636, 602 P.2d 731, 736, 159 Cal. Rptr. 811, 816 (1979) (holding that management may
attribute a mobilehome tenant's guest's misbehavior to the tenant in order to insure compliance with
the park's reasonable rules and regulations, and that a subsequent notice of termination of tenancy
would not be in violation of Civil Code § 789.5); 74 Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. 122, 124 (1991) (stating
that a mobilehome park owner may not prohibit the display by tenants of political signs in the
windows of the mobilehomes, and that a notice of termination of tenancy on that basis is wrongful
and in violation of Civil Code § 789.56).
4.
See CAL HEALTH & SAFmY CODE § 18005.8 (West Supp. 1992) (defining legal owner).
5.
See id. § 18005.3 (West Supp. 1992) (defining junior lienholder).
6.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 798.55(b) (amended by Chapter 835). The notice must inform tie
homeowner that the mobilehome must be removed from the park within a period of not less than 60
days from the date of the notice. Id. Management of the mobilehome park must send a copy of the
notice to the legal owner, each junior lienholder and the registered owner within 10 days of notice
to the homeowner. Id. The legal owner and each junior lienholder must inform management of their
intended course of action on the matter. Id.; see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1162 (West 1982)
(providing the procedural requirements for the service of the notice).
7.
CAL Crv. CODE § 798.55(b) (amended by Chapter 835). The second notice must be sent
by certified or registered mail with return receipt requested. Id. Apparently by enacting Chapter 835,
the Legislature is addressing the problem of loss of mobilehome financing, a situation which has been
caused by the depreciation in mobilehome values. ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMI-rEE COimflTTEE
ANALYSIS OF AB 2715, at 2 (May 6, 1992). Such depreciation of mobilehome value is caused when
mobilehomes are forced off mobilehome parks. Id.
8.
CAL. Civ. CODE § 798.56a(b)(4) (amended by Chapter 835).
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Property; mortgages--default
Civil Code §§ 2924b, 2924c, 2924g, 2924h, 2924j (amended).
AB 2981 (Boland); 1992 STAT. Ch. 351
Existing law imposes enumerated obligations' upon a
mortgagor 2 or trustor 3 in default4 prior to reinstatement of a deed
of trust5 or mortgage.' Chapter 351 additionally requires that the
trustor or mortgagor provide written evidence to the beneficiary or
mortgagee that the amounts in arrears7 have been paid prior to
reinstatement of the trust or mortgage.'
1.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924c (amended by Chapter 351) (permitting default of a mortgage
or deed of trust to be satisfied upon payment by the defaulting party of. (1) All amounts of principal,
interest, taxes, assessments, insurance premiums, or advances in default; (2) all recurring obligations
in default but not included in the notice of default; and (3) all reasonable costs and expenses incurred,
including attorneys* fees, in the enforcement of the deed of trust or mortgage in default).
2.
See JESSE DuKewmiER & JAMEs E. Kium, PROPERTY 588-91 (2d ed. 1988) (defining
mortgages and mortgagor).
3.
See Lupertino v. Carbahal, 35 Cal. App. 3d 742, 747-48, 111 Cal. Rptr. 112, 115-16
(1973) (describing the nature of a trustee and the legal relationship between a trustor, trustee, and
beneficiary); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1515 (6th ed. 1990) (defining trustor).
4.
See CAL. Civ. CODE § 2924 (West Supp. 1992) (describing notice of default and election
to sell); id § 2949 (West 1974) (limiting declaration of default on the occasioning of further
encumbering of real property).
5.
See BLACK'S LAW DIcTnoNARY 414 (6th ed. 1990) (defining deed of trust); id at 15081514 (defining trusts); DUKEMIIER & KRIER, supra note 2, at 590-91 (describing the deed of trust
and distinguishing it from a mortgage); see also Bank of Italy Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Bentley,
217 Cal. 644, 654, 20 P.2d 940, 944 (1933) (noting that the law in California defines deeds of trusts
as instruments creating liens, as do mortgages, but, as are different from mortgages, deeds of trusts
pass title to a trustee, and the statute of limitations never runs against deeds of trusts); id at 654, 20
P.2d at 944 (noting that at common law and in most other states, a deed of trust is a mortgage with
a power of sale); Py v. Pleitner, 70 Cal. App. 2d 576, 579, 161 P.2d 393, 395 (1945) (distinguishing
deeds of trust and mortgages).
6.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924c (amended by Chapter 351); see i § 2920 (West Supp. 1992);
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 50083 (West 1986) (defining mortgages); CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924
(West Supp. 1992) (describing mortgages); id § 2928 (West 1974) (limiting the extent to which
mortgages create personal obligations); see also id § 2922 (West 1974) (requiting that to be valid,
mortgages must be in writing); id § 2948 (West 1974) (prescribing the written form of a mortgage);
Del Carlo v. County of Sonoma, 245 Cal. App. 2d 36, 39, 53 Cal. Rptr. 771, 773 (1966) (holding
that the form is not important where the instrument evidences an intention of the parties to create a
mortgage); Teater v. Good Hope Dev. Corp., 14 Cal. 2d 196, 209, 93 P.2d 112, 119 (1939) (noting
that, irrespective of the language used by the parties, where an instrument purports to establish a lien
on property, a mortgage is created).
7.
See BLACK'S LAw DIcTIONARY 109 (6th ed. 1990) (defining arrears as money overdue
and unpaid).
8.
CAL. Civ: CODE § 2924c (amended by Chapter 351).
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Prior law specified that a person curing a default of trust deed or
mortgage could request that the beneficiary or mortgagee or their
successors in interest' cause to be recorded 1" within thirty days of
the request, a notice of rescission of the declaration of default and
demand for sale.t" Chapter 351 requires that the instruments
rescinding the declaration of default and demand for sale must be
delivered within twenty-one days of reinstatement to the trustee who
must cause them to be recorded within thirty days. 2
Prior law permitted a trustor in default to request a postponement
of the sale proceedings for not more than one business day for the
purpose of securing sufficient cash to satisfy the obligation or bid at
the sale.' 3 Chapter 351 deletes the authority of a trustor in default to
postpone the sale.' 4
Existing law prohibits engaging in activities designed to restrain
or fix bidding at a sale of property conducted pursuant to a power of

9.
See BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1431-32 (6th ed. 1990) (defining successor in interest).
10.
See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1213 (West Supp. 1992) (describing the legal consequences of
recording an instrument effecting a conveyance of real property); id. § 1214 (West Supp. 1992)
(describing the priorities of subsequent recorded conveyances).
11.
1990 Cal. Stat. ch. 657, sec. 2, at 2753 (amending CAL. Civ. CODE § 2924c) (amended
by Chapter 351); see CAL. CIV. CODE § 2941 (West Supp. 1992) (requiring a certificate of discharge
when a mortgage or deed of trust is satisfied).
12.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924c (amended by Chapter 351); cf. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-50-114
(Michie Supp. 1991) (permitting a mortgagor in default to pay all sums in arrears as well as costs
and expenses incurred, including attorney's and trustee's fees, thereby reinstating the mortgage or
deed of trust, after which the beneficiary or mortgagee would be obligated to file with the recorder
a cancellation of the recorded notice of default); IDAHO CODE § 45-1506 (Supp. 1992) (providing for
curing of default and dismissal of proceedings for foreclosure); Miss. CODE. ANN. § 89-1-59 (1972)
(permitting the debtor to make payments past due, including all accrued costs, attorneys' and trustee's
fees on amounts past due, and so reinstate the deed of trust and stop a threatened sale under the terms
of the deed); NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1012 (1990) (enumerating requirements similar to those of
Arkansas Code § 18-50-114, infra); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-10-16 (1987) (permitting any person to
pay the amount in arrears on a deed of trust declared due or accelerated by reason of a breach or
default, along with costs and reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses of the trustee and beneficiary
in exercising the power of sale and canceling the notice of sale); UTAH CODE ANN. §57-1-31 (1990)
(requiring the beneficiary, upon demand of any person having an interest in trust property, to deliver
to the trustee a request to execute, acknowledge, and deliver a cancellation of the recorded notice of
default under a trust deed); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.24.090 (West 1990) (requiring that the
trustee execute, acknowledge, and cause to be recorded a notice of discontinuance of trustee's sale
upon reinstatement of a deed of trust previously in default).
13.
1986 Cal. Stat. ch. 1385, sec. 4, at 4943 (amending CAL. Civ. CODE § 2924g).
14.
CAL Civ. CODE § 2924g(c) (amended by Chapter 351); cf IDAHO CODE § 45-15-6B
(1983) (permitting any person having a right to reinstate the deed of trust, including the trustor in
default, to request a postponement of the foreclosure sale).

Pacific Law Journa,/Vol 24

Property

sale 5 in a deed of trust or mortgage. 16 Chapter 351 permits any
person to17state that the property is being sold in an "as is"
condition.
Prior law specified ten days as the interval of time following
recordation of a notice of default and notification of parties
requesting notice."1 Prior law required that the publication of notice
of default commence ten days following recording of the notice.19
Chapter 351 specifies that, in both instances, the interval is ten
business days.20
Existing law enumerates the manner of distribution of proceeds
of a sale of property conducted pursuant to a power of sale in a deed
of trust or mortgage.21 Chapter 351 further specifies that fees
charged by the clerk will be deducted from the amount of the
proceeds of the sale.22
SEA
Property: nuisance actions--controlled substances
Health and Safety Code § 11571 (amended).
AB 2906 (Bentley); 1992 STAT. Ch. 198

(Effective July 14, 1992)

15.
See CAL. Cv. CODE § 2924 (West Supp. 1992) (describing power of sale).
16.
IcL§ 2924h(g) (amended by Chapter 351).
17.
Id.; see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 114 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "as is").
18.
1989 Cal. Stat. ch. 698, sec. 5, at 2060 (amending CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924b) (amended
by Chapter 351); see Lupertino v. Carbahal, 35 Cal. App. 3d 742, 747, 111 Cal. Rptr. 112, 115
(1973) (holding as valid a trustee's exercising of power of sale where trustee adhered to literal terms
of Civil Code § 2924b).
19.
1989 Cal. Stat. ch. 698, sec. 5, at 2060 (amending CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924b).
20.
CAL. Civ. CODE § 2924b(b), (d) (amended by Chapter 351).
21.
Id. § 2924j(c) (amended by Chapter 351).
22.
Id.; see Nomelini Constr. Co. v. Modesto Sav.& Loan Ass'n, 275 Cal. App. 2d 114,118,
79 Cal. Rptr. 717, 720 (1969) (observing that the proceeds of sales are ffist applied to pay for the
expenses of the sale, second, to satisfy the obligations for which the sale was conducted, and third,
the remainder after all liens and costs are satisfied to the mortgagor or trustor).
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Under existing law, whenever there is reason to believe that a
nuisance' involving controlled substances2 is kept, maintained, or
exists in any county, the District Attorney3 or a city attorney may
bring an action to abate the nuisance.4 Chapter 198 mandates that
whenever such an abatement involves a residential building,
dwelling, or place5 , the owner of the property must be provided with
notice of the action and must be given a reasonable time 6 to abate the
nuisance.7 Chapter 198 specifies that notice is not required if the

1.
See CAL. CIv. CODE § 3479 (West 1970) (defining nuisance); id. § 3480 (West 1970)
(defining public nuisance as one which effects at the same time an entire community or
neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance or
damage inflicted upon individuals may be unequal); id. § 3481 (West 1970) (defining private as
nuisance every nuisance not included in the definition of public nuisance). See Akis v. Sacramento
Mun. Util. Dist., 6 Cal. App. 4th 1605, 1645, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785, 810, 811 (1992) (holding that in
order for a private party to maintain an action for a public nuisance, the party must show special
damages different in kind and not merely degree from that suffered by other members of the
populace); Institoris v. City of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 3d 10, 19,258 Cal. Rptr. 418,423 (1989)
(holding that private nuisance can support recovery only for harm to property interest, not for
personal injury).
2.
See CAL. HEALTr & SAI'1rrv CODE § 11570 (West 1991) (authorizing a nuisance action
where a building or place is used for the purpose of unlawfully selling, serving, storing, keeping,
manufacturing, or giving away any controlled substance, precursor, or analog); see also id. § 11007
(West 1991) (defining controlled substance).
3.
See CAL. GoV'T CODE § 24000(a) (West 1988) (establishing the office of District
Attorney); id. §§ 26500-26543 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992) (setting forth the powers and duties of a
District Attorney).
4.
CAL HEALTH & SAFmT CODE § 11571 (amended by Chapter 198); see CAL CIV. PROC.
CODE § 731 (West 1980) (establishing an action to abate a nuisance); see also People v. Lot 23, 735
P.2d 184, 189-90 (Colo. 1987) (holding that cash or currency found in a building deemed to be a
public nuisance for the sale and distribution of controlled substances is subject to forfeiture regardless
of whether the cash or currency is found in close proximity to the contraband); State v. Reis, 430
A.2d 749, 754 (R.I. 1981) (holding that a showing of a common nuisance created by the sale, use,
or keeping of controlled substances requires more than an isolated instance of prohibited activity);
cf Riding v. State, 527 N.E.2d 185, 188 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988); Sayre v. State, 471 N.E.2d 708, 71617 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that an owner must know and intend that the building be used for

keeping or selling a controlled substance in order for the owner to be convicted for maintaining a
public nuisance).
5.
See CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 20508 (West Supp. 1992) (defining residential dwelling);
see also CAL. INS. CODE § 5001(c) (West Supp. 1992) (defining residential property).

6.
See CAL. HEALTH & SAFY CODE § 11571(b)(4) (amended by Chapter 198) (defining
reasonable time as thirty days, unless a shorter time period is agreed to by the owner and the agency
issuing the notice).
7.
Id. § 11571(b)(1) (amended by Chapter 198); cf ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 37-4 (,Vest
Supp. 1992) (permitting courts to restrain or abate the nuisance without notice); VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-258 (Michie 1992) (requiring that the owner must know of the unlawful use and must have the
right to reenter the property for a judgment to be entered against the owner).
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nuisance creates a danger to the public, the notice would impede an
investigation, the owner is unavailable or is evading service of
process, or other good cause exists.' Chapter 198 further provides
that if a particular tenant9 is identified as responsible for the
nuisance, the tenant must be served with notice or informed of where
the tenant may obtain a copy of the notice."° Finally, Chapter 198
provides that the failure to serve notice on a property owner may be
considered by the court as a mitigating factor in determining an
owner's civil penalties for failing to abate a nuisance. 1 Chapter 198
shall remain in effect until January 1, 1996, at which time section
11571 of the Health and Safety Code shall be amended to read as it
did prior to the amendments under Chapter 198.12
SRM
Property; nuisance--agricultural processing activities
Civil Code § 3482.6 (new); § 3482.5 (amended).
AB 1190 (Hannigan); 1992 STAT. Ch. 97

8.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFrmy CODE § 11571(b)(6) (amended by Chapter 198). Good cause
includes: (a) A danger to the public; (b) that the notice would impede an investigation; (c) a
determination by the District Attorney or city attorney that good cause exists to forego the notice;
(d) the owner is unavailable or is evading service of process. Id. In reviewing whether a notice is
required, the court shall presume that the determination made by the issuing agency is valid. Id.
9.
See id. § 50852(h) (West Supp. 1992) (defining tenant as a person entitled by written or
oral agreement, subtenancy approved by the owner, or sufferance, to occupy a unit to the exclusion

of others).
10.
Id. § 11571(c) (amended by Chapter 198). In addition, the tenant must be given an
opportunity to demonstrate that the notice was issued on insufficient grounds. Id. § 11571(c)(3)
(amended by Chapter 198).
11.
Id. § 11571(d) (amended by Chapter 198); see Review of Selected 1991 California
Legislation, 23 PAC. LJ. 732 (1992) (discussing available penalties in nuisance abatement actions

involving controlled substances).
12.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFEMY CODE § 11571(e) (amended by Chapter 198); 1992 Cal. Stat. ch.
1948, sec. 2, at _

Selected 1992 Legislation

Property
1
Under existing law, an agricultural activity, operation, or facility
conducted or maintained for commercial purposes may not be
deemed a public' or private' nuisance4 due to any changed
condition in or about the locality, if the facility has operated for more
than three years.5 Chapter 97 provides that an agricultural processing

1.
See CAL. CIv. CODE § 3482.5(e) (amended by Chapter 97) (defining agricultural activity,
operation, or facility).
2.
See id § 3480 (West 1970) (defining public nuisance as one which affects at the same
time an entire community of people). See generally Vasquez v. Alameda, 49 Cal. 2d. 674, 321 P.2d
1 (1958); People v. George, 42 Cal. App. 2d 568, 109 P.2d 404 (1941) (discussing the effects of
public nuisances).
3.
See CAL. Civ. CODE § 3481 (West 1970) (defining private nuisance as every nuisance not
defined in California Civil Code § 3480). See generally Reinhard v. Lawrence, 41 Cal. App. 2d 107,
741 P.2d 501 (1940); Fendley v. Alexander, 110 Cal. App. 731,294 P. 769 (1931) (discussing private
nuisances and their effects).
4.
See CAL. Civ. CODE § 3479 (West 1970) (defining nuisance); see also id § 3482 (West
1970) (defining acts not deemed a nuisance); id § 3483 (West 1970) (recognizing liability of
successive owners of nuisance); id § 3484 (West 1970) (indicating the effect of abatement on an
action for damages).
5.
Id § 3482.5(a)(1) (amended by Chapter 97); see Review of Selected 1981 California
Legislation, 13 PAC. U. 786 (1982) (discussing the enactment of California Civil Code § 3482.5).
The 52nd District Agricultural Association, which conducts activities on the grounds of the California
Exposition and State Fair, is exempted from this provision. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3482.5(a)(2) (amended
by Chapter 97). Chapter 97 takes precedence over any contrary provision of a city, county, or other
political subdivision. Id § 3482.5(d) (amended by Chapter 97). Cf ALA. CODE § 6-5-127 (1991);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-112 (1992); CoO. REv. STAT. § 35-3.5-102 (1991) (defining nuisances
in agricultural settings). See generally THE DAImy TEL GRAPH, Old MacdonaldHad a Noisy, Smelly,
Unneighborly Old Farm, May 25, 1992, at I (discussing the effects of agricultural processing
nuisances).
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activity6 may not become a private or public nuisance due to any
changed conditions in or about the locality after it has continuously
operated more than three years.7
STL
Property; procedures and standards for recordation
Government Code §§ 27324,27361.5,27361.6 (repealed and
new); §§ 27201,27361 (amended).
AB 689 (Tucker); 1992 STAT. Ch. 87
Existing law requires the county recorder,1 upon the payment of
4
3
proper fees and taxes, 2 to accept for recordation any instrument

6.
See CA. CIV. CODE § 3482.6(e)(1) (enacted by Chapter 97) (defining agricultural
processing activity).
7.
lI § 3482.6 (enacted by Chapter 97); see id § 3982.6(b) (enacted by Chapter 97)
(permitting a nuisance damage action for any substantial increase in activities or operations, and
creating a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence that the increase was
not substantial); see also CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 338 (West Supp. 1992) (providing for a three year
statute of limitations in a nuisance action). Section 3482.6 permits a city, county, or other political
subdivision to adopt an ordinance that permits notification to a prospective homeowner that the
dwelling is in close proximity to an agricultural processing activity, operation, or facility. CAL. CIV.
CODE § 3482.6(d) (enacted by Chapter 97). Chapter 97 does not apply to any litigation pending prior
to January 1, 1993, nor any cause of action which accrued, but which has not yet been filed prior to
January 1, 1993. Id. § 3482.6(b) (enacted by Chapter 97). The immunity created by Chapter 97 does
not apply to air pollution violations under California Health & Safety Code § 41700, which prohibits
the discharge of any quantities of air contaminants or other material which cause injury, detriment,
nuisance, or annoyance to the public. l § 3482.6(d) (enacted by Chapter 97). See generallyMangini
v. Aerojet-General Corp., 230 Cal. App. 3d 1125, 1139, 281 Cal. Rptr. 827, 837 (1991) (discussing
the "coming to the nuisance" defense in nuisance actions); PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 611 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing assumption of the risk relating to a purchaser of land "coming
to the nuisance"). But see 11 B.E. WrrixN, SuMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Equity, § 150 (9th ed.

1990) (noting that consent is not a defense to a nuisance action); RESTATEMfENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS
§ 840B (Supp. 1992) (discussing contributory negligence in a nuisance setting).

1.
See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 11903 (West 1970) (defining recorder); CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 27201 (amended by Chapter 87) (specifying the duties of the county recorder).
2.
See CAL Gov'T CODE § 27361 (West Supp. 1992) (establishing the fees for recording and
indexing of every instrument authorized by law to be recorded).
3.
See id § 27322 (West 1988) (indicating the required manner of recordation).
4.
See id. § 27279 (West Supp. 1992) (defining instrument).
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which is authorized by law to be recorded.5 Chapter 87 requires
those documents to comply with specified standards for format, 6
size,7 quality of paper8 and other related matters.9

STL
Property; recreational vehicle parks
Civil Code §§ 799.20, 799.21,799.22, 799.23, 799.24,
799.25, 799.26, 799.27, 799.28, 799.29, 799.30, 799.31,
799.32, 799.40, 799.41, 799.42, 799.43, 799.44, 799.45,
799.46, 799.55, 799.56, 799.57, 799.58, 799.59, 799.65,
799.66, 799.67, 799.70, 799.71,799.75, 799.78,799.79
(repealed and new).
AB 3074 (Wyman); 1992 STAT. Ch. 310
Chapter 310 repeals the Recreational Vehicle Park Occupancy
Law (RVPOL) and re-enacts the RVPOL in different form.'

5.
Ide §§ 27280-27297.5 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992); see Review of Selected 1973
Legislation, 5 PAC. LJ. 460 (1974) (reviewing amendments to California Government Code §
27288.1). See generally, Carpenters Health and Welfare Trust Fund v. Shafer, 146 Cal. App. 3d 504,
509, 194 Cal. Rptr. 266, 270 (1983) (holding that a county recorder may refuse to perform official
duties until a fee is paid).
6.
See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 27201 (amended by Chapter 87) (providing that recorded
documents must be "photographically reproducible" as defined by standards set forth by the
American National Standards Institute or the Association for the Information and Image Management,
and providing that each instrument, paper or notice shall contain an original signature).
7.
See id, § 27361.5 (repealed and enacted by Chapter 87) (defining appropriate size for
recorded documents as a single-sided 8 and 1/2 inches by 11 inches piece of paper, which may not
exceed 14 inches in length).
8.
See id, § 27361.6 (repealed and enacted by Chapter 87) (defining the margin requirements
as at least 1/2 inch vertical margins, and defining the quality of paper required for recordation as that
which can be legibly reproduced).
9.
Id. § 27324 (repealed and enacted by Chapter 87); see i § 27361 (amended by Chapter
87) (requiring extra fees to be charged for nonconformance). Chapter 87 becomes operative on July
1, 1994. 1992 Cal. Stat. ch. 87, sec. 9, at _.

1.

SENATE HOUSiNo AND URBAN AFFAms COMMrrEE, ANALYSIS OF AB 3074, at 2 (June

16, 1992).
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Prior law defined the term, occupant, as a person who occupies
a recreational vehicle park for less than thirty days.2 Chapter 310
defines occupant as the owner or operator of a recreational vehicle3
who occupies a recreational vehicle park for thirty days or less.
Prior law defined the term, tenant, as one who occupies a recreational
vehicle park for thirty days or more.4 Chapter 310 defines tenant as
the owner or operator of a recreational vehicle who occupies a
recreational vehicle park for more than thirty days.5 Chapter 310
further provides that recreational parkmanagement may offer a rental
agreement to a park occupant who intends to remain in the park in
excess of thirty days.6
Prior law provided that a seventy-two hour notice to vacate must
be personally served upon an occupant. 7 Chapter 310 provides that
a seventy-two hour notice to vacate may be personally served upon
a defaulting occupant 8 or left with a person of suitable age and
discretion who is occupying the recreational vehicle. 9 Chapter 310
also stipulates the reasons for termination of the right of occupancy
of a defaulting resident.1"
STL

2.
1980 Cal. Stat. ch. 502, sec. 15, at 3428 (amending CAL. Ctv. CODE § 799.28).
3.
CAL. Civ. CODE § 799.28 (enacted by Chapter 310).
4.
1980 Cal. Stat. ch. 502, sec. 16, at 3428 (amending CAL. Civ. CODE § 799.32).
5.
CAL. Civ. CODE § 799.32 (enacted by Chapter 310); cf FLA. STAT. ANN. § 513.01(7)
(West 1991) (defining a transient guest as one who stays in a recreational vehicle park for six months
or less); Oino REv. CODE ANN. § 3733.01 (Baldwin 1991) (defining tenant as a person who is
entitled to occupy a manufactured home lot and resident as a person entitled to the use of residential
premises to the exclusion of others).
6.
CAL. Civ. CODE § 799.45 (enacted by Chapter 310).
7.
1979 Cal. Stat. ch. 1185, sec. 3, at 4629 (enacting CAL. Civ. CODE § 799.56).
8.
See CAL. Civ. CODE § 799.22 (enacted by Chapter 310) (defining defaulting occupant as
an occupant who fails to pay for his or her occupancy in a park).
9.
Il § 799.56(a) (enacted by Chapter 310); see 4 B.E. WrrmN, SUMMARY OF CALEFORNIA
LAW, Real Property § 527 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1992) (discussing the Recreational Vehicle Park
Occupancy Law and notice to tenants).
10.
CAL. Civ. CODE § 799.70 (enacted by Chapter 310). The reasons for termination include:
(1) Nonpayment of rent, utilities, or reasonable incidental service charges; (2) failure to comply with
state or local law; (3) conduct which constitutes a substantial annoyance to other occupants; (4)
conviction of prostitution or felony possession of a controlled substance; (5) condemnation of the
park; or (6) a change of use of the park or any portion thereof. IL § 799.70(a)-(g) (enacted by
Chapter 310). See id § 799.23 (enacted by Chapter 310) (defining defaulting resident).
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Property; register of historical resources
Public Resources Code §§ 5020.7,5024.1,21084.1 (new); §§
5020.1, 5020.4, 5024.5, 5024.6, 21084 (amended).

AB 2881 (Frazee); 1992 STAT. Ch. 1075
Under existing law, the California State Historical Resources
Commission' is required to develop criteria and procedures for a
California Register of Historical Resources. 2 Chapter 1075 sets forth
specified criteria for nominating a historical resource for inclusion in
the register, and names certain properties the register shall or may
include.' Chapter 1075 further provides that all owners of property
nominated as a historic resource, as well as the local government in
which the resource is located, other interested persons, and members
of the public shall be provided at least sixty days notice of the
nomination.4 In addition, owners of properties nominated as a
historic resource may object to the nomination and the property may

1.
See CAL. PUB. R.s. CODE §§ 5020.2-5020.3 (West Supp. 1992) (setting forth the
organization of the State Historical Resources Commission); id. § 5020.4 (amended by Chapter 1075)
(setting forth the powers and duties of the State Historical Resources Commission).
2.
Id. § 5020.4(c) (amended by Chapter 1075); see id. § 5024.1 (enacted by Chapter 1075)
(describing the historical register); id. § 5020.1 (amended by Chapter 1075) (defining historical
resource); 16 U.S.C. § 470s (1988) (defining historic property or resource as any prehistoric or
historic district, site, building, structure, or object included in, or eligible for inclusion in the National
Register of Historic Places).
3.
CAL PUB. REs. CODE § 5024.1(b)-(e) (enacted by Chapter 1075). A portion of the criteria
for the California register is taken from the criteria set forth for the National Register of Historic

Places. Id. California property previously deemed eligible for the national register shall also be listed
on the California register. Id; see 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1985) (setting forth the provisions of the National
Historic Preservation Act, including the establishment of a National Register of Historic Places); see
also 36 C.F.R. §§ 61.1-61.9 (1991) (detailing the regulations implementing the National Historic
Preservation Act); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978) (holding
that owners of a railroad terminal designated a historic landmark could not establish a regulatory
taking under the Fifth Amendment by simply showing that they had been denied the ability to exploit
the superadjacent airspace). See generally Chancey L Walker & Marcia A. Isracloff, Historic
Preservationandthe InstitutionalOwner, 14 J.C. & U.L 59 (1987) (describing some of the problems
of declaring parts of institutions as historical resources).
4.
CAL. PuB. RFs. CODE § 5024.1(0(2) (enacted by Chapter 1075).
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not be placed on the register until the owner's objection is
withdrawn.'
Existing law, known as the California Environmental Quality Act
(CEQA) 6 requires a lead agency' to prepare an environmental
impact report8 on any project9 which may have a significant effect
on the environment, and provides guidelines for exemptions to the
report requirement. 10 Chapter 1075 specifies that no project causing
a substantial adverse change 1' to a historical resource 2 may be
exempted from the report requirement. 3
SRM

5.
Id. § 5024.1(0(4) (enacted by Chapter 1075); see id.
§ 5024.1(0(6) (enacted by Chapter
1075) (outlining procedures for objecting to a nomination).
6.
See id.
§§ 21000-21177 (West 1986 & Supp. 1992) (setting forth the provisions of the
California Environmental Quality Act).
7.
See id.§ 21067 (West 1986) (defining lead agency as the public agency which has
principal responsibility for carrying out or approving a project which may have a significant effect
upon the environment).
8.
See id. § 21061 (West 1986) (defining environmental impact report as a detailed statement
setting forth the matters specified in §§ 21100 and 21100.1 of the California Public Resources Code).
An environmental impact report must address such matters as the significant environmental effects
of the proposed project, proposed mitigation measures for such effects, and any alternatives to the
proposed project. kL § 21100 (West 1986).
9.
See id.§ 21065 (West 1986) (defining project).
10.
Id. §§ 21100,21084 (West 1986 & Supp. 1992); see CAL. CODE REGS. tit.14, §§ 1500015387 (1991) (setting forth the guidelines for implementing the reporting requirements of CEQA);
id. §§ 15260-15277 (1991) (setting forth the exemptions to the reporting requirements of CEQA);
Dusek v. Anaheim Redev. Agency, 173 Cal. App. 3d 1029, 1043, 219 Cal. Rptr. 346, 354 (1986)
(holding that CEQA does not compel retention of old buildings in the name of historical
preservation); San Diego Trust & Say. Bank v. Friends of Gill, 121 Cal. App. 3d 203, 209, 174 Cal.
Rptr. 784, 787 (1981) (holding that the issuance of a demolition permit of an historical site is a
discretionary act subject to the Environmental Quality Act); Foundation for San Francisco's
Architectural Heritage v. City and County of San Francisco, 106 Cal. App. 3d 893, 917, 165 Cal.
Rptr 401,415 (1980) (holding that the Environmental Quality Act cannot guarantee that government
decisions will always favor historical considerations); cf Orinda Ass'n v. Board of Supervisors, 182
Cal. App. 3d 1145, 1172, 227 Cal. Rptr. 688, 706 (1986) (holding that demolition of historic
buildings was part of a development project, and thus the Board of Supervisors were not authorized
to issue a demolition permit before the entire? CEQA process was completed); Wildlife Alive v.
Chickering, 18 Cal. 3d 190, 206, 553 P.2d 537, 545, 132 Cal. Rptr. 377, 385 (1976) (holding that
where there is any reasonable possibility that a project or activity may have a significant impact on
the environment, an exemption from the requirements of the CEQA is improper).
11.
See CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 5020.1(q) (amended by Chapter 1075) (defining substantial
adverse change as demolition, destruction, relocation, or alteration such that the significance of an
historical resource would be impaired).
12.
See id. § 21084.1 (enacted by Chapter 1075) (defining historical resource for purposes of
this provision).
13.
IM § 21084(e) (amended by Chapter 1075).
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Property; rent control--mobilehome parks
Civil Code § 798.18 (amended).
SB 1454 (Craven); 1992 STAT. Ch. 289
2
Under existing law, mobilehome' park rental agreements,
whether or not exempt from local rent controls, 3 may contain
provisions effecting extensions or renewals of tenancy automatically
or at the sole option of either the management 4 or the homeowner.'

1.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 798.3 (West Supp. 1992) (defining mobilehome as a habitable
structure designed for being moved on a highway under permit). Section 798.3 includes manufactured
homes, but excludes recreational vehicles and commercial coaches. Id; see CAL. HEALTH & SAFmY
CODE § 18007 (West 1984) (defining manufactured homes); id § 18008 (Vest Supp. 1992) (defining
mobilehomes); CAL. VEH. CODE § 635 (West 1987) (including park trailers in the definition of trailer
coaches).
2.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 798.8 (West Supp. 1992) (defining rental agreement).
3.
See id. § 798.17 (Vest Supp. 1992) (exempting rental agreements conforming to criteria
set forth in § 798.17(b) of the Civil Code from rent control devices adopted by any local governmental entity); id. § 798.45 (West Supp. 1992) (exempting new construction from rent control
ordinances, rules, regulations, or initiatives adopted by any city or county); see also id. § 798.7 (West
Supp. 1992) (defining new construction as those spaces initially held out for rent after January 1,
1990); Yee v. City of Escondido, 224 Cal. App. 3d 1349, 1358, 274 Cal. Rptr. 551, 557 (1990)
(holding that local rent control ordinances are a legitimate exercise of police power and are not an
unconstitutional regulatory taking); Oceanside Mobilehome Park Owners' Ass'n v. City of Oceanside,
157 Cal. App. 3d 887, 897, 204 Cal. Rptr. 239, 245 (1984) (affiming the facial constitutionality of
a rent control measure designed to eliminate excessive rents and to insure a reasonable return to
landlords). Numerous states permit rent control measures as a means of limiting excessive rents and
insuring an adequate housing supply. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1415 (1990); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 3601 fWest Supp. 1991); MD. GEN. PRov. CODE ANN. § 10h (1991); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 42-74 (West 1987); N.Y. UNCONSOL LAw § 2520.3 (McKinney 1987); V.I. CODE
ANN. tit. 28, § 834 (1991) (imposing maximum rent ceilings). However, equally numerous are states
proscribing the enacting of rent control measures for privately owned property. See, e.g., MICH.
Co p. LAWs ANN. § 123.411 (West 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-8a-1 (Michie 1992); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 42-14.1 (1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 14-101.1 (West Supp. 1992); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 6-1-13 (Law. Co-op. 1976); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.1 (Michie 1986). Still others permit rent
control measures under only particular circumstances. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 471.9996 (West
Supp. 1992) (requiring approval in a general election before enactment of rent control measures on
private residential property); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-20-1 (1990) (proscribing rent control without
express approval of Legislature).
4.
See CAL. CIv. CODE § 798.2 (West Supp. 1992) (defining management).
5.
Id § 798.16 (West Supp. 1992); see id. § 798.15 (West Supp. 1992) (specifying required
contents of the rental agreement); id. § 798.9 (West Supp. 1992) (defining homeowner as a person
who has a tenancy in a mobilehome park under a rental agreement); id. § 798.11 (West Supp. 1992)
(defining resident as a homeowner or other person who lawfully occupies a mobilehome); id. §
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Chapter 289 specifies that rental agreements for mobilehome park
tenancies of twelve months or less may not contain provisions
effecting extension or renewal beyond the initial agreement term at
the sole option of either the management or the homeowner if the
extension or renewal is for a term longer than twelve months.6
SEA
Property; security interests
Civil Code § 2938.1 (new).
SB 1323 (Davis); 1992 STAT. Ch. 453
Under existing law, a written assignment of an interest1 in rents,
issues, and profits of real property is deemed perfected 2 on the date
it is recorded.3 Under Chapter 453, such an assignment given as
additional security4 is also perfected when recorded in the county
where the real property is located. 5 Under Chapter 453, the
beneficiaries or mortgagees of such recorded assignments need not
take further action' to perfect the assignment. 7 Chapter 453,

798.12 (West Supp. 1992) (defining tenancy).
6.
Ud § 798.18(c) (amended by Chapter 289).

1.
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1235.125 (West 1982) (defining interest in real property).
2.
See Bramble Transp. v. Sam Senter Sales, Inc., 294 A.3d 97, 102 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971)
(holding that perfection entails those steps legally required to give the secured party an interest in
the subject property against the debtor's creditors).
3.
CAT. CIV. CODE § 2938 (West Supp. 1992).
4.
See 3 B.E. WrrKiN, SuMMARY op CALIFoRNIA LAw, Security Transactions in Real
Property,§§ 88-89, at 594 (9th ed. 1987) (stating that where an assignment of rents and profits is
made as an additional security, the mortgagee is not entitled to rents until the mortgagee has
perfected the lien by acquiring lawful possession of the property either personally, through an agent,
or by an action to enforce a pledge, and stating that assignment is not dependent on the mortgagee's
possession); see also Kinnison v Guaranty Liquidating Corp., 18 Cal. 2d 256, 260-61, 115 P.2d 450,
452-53 (1941) (holding that where rents are pledged as security interest, the mortgagee must acquire
possession of the property).
5.
CAL. Crv. CODE § 2938.1(a) (enacted by Chapter 453).
6.
See id. (providing that such action includes possession of the property or appointment of
a court receiver).
7.
Id.
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however, specifies that no rights may be exercised under the
assignment until the trustor or mortgagor defaults on the loan
obligations. 8
SRM
Property; subdivisions--final maps
Government Code § 66459 (new).
AB 3013 (Conroy); 1992 STAT. Ch. 1098
2
1
Under existing law, a subdivider must file a tentative map
when converting a unit of property to a condominium, 3 community
apartment, 4 or stock cooperative project. 5 Existing law further

8.
Id. § 2938.1(b) (enacted by Chapter 453). Chapter 453 only applies to assignments as
additional security executed on or after January 1, 1993. Id. § 2938.1(d) (enacted by Chapter 453).
Chapter 453's apparent purpose is to ensure that an assignment a additional security cannot be
defeated by a borrower's subsequent filing of bankruptcy. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE,
CoMi!irrE ANALYSIS OF SB 1323, at 2 (May 5,1992); Telephone interview with Charles Fennassee,
Consultant, Senator Davis' Office, May 27, 1992 (notes on file at the Pacific Law Journal;see I1
U.S.C. § 552 (1992) (permitting valid enforceable prebankruptcy security interests in rents or profits
to survive in bankruptcy); In re Kramer, 107 B.R. 668, 669 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989) (stating that the
right to interests in rents or profits are not cut off by bankruptcy; if state law permits a mortgagee
the rents, so must the bankruptcy court).

1.
See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66423 (West 1983) (defining subdivider as a person, firm,
corporation, partnership, or association who divides or proposes to divide real property into a

subdivision).
2.
See id.§ 66424.5 (West 1992) (defining tentative map).
3.
See CAL. CiV. CODE § 1351(f) (West Supp. 1992) (defining condominium as an estate in
a portion of real property coupled with a separate interest in space called a unit).
4.
See id § 1351(d) (West Supp. 1992) (defining community apartment project as an
undivided interest in land coupled with the right to exclusive occupancy of an apartment which is
located on that land).
5.
CAL Gov'T CODE § 66426 (West 1983); see CAL. Civ. CODE § 1351(m) (West Supp
1992) (defining stock cooperative project as a development which is held by a corporation formed
primarily for the purpose of holding improved real property). See generally CALIFORNIA
CONDoNmIiUM AND PLANNED DEvELoPmENT PRACtiCE § 2.26, at 79 (Cal. Continuing Educ. Bar
1984 & Supp. 1992) (discussing when tentative maps are required); JOHN PAUL HANNA, CALIFORNIA
CONDOMINIUM HANDBOOK wrrH FoRMs §§ 145-150 (1986) (discussing California law as it relates
to conversions of apartments to condominiums); Patricia J. Williams, Real Property-Restrictionsand

Regulations-Condominium Conversions and Ownership Restrictions; California's Coastal
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requires the subdivider to notify6 each person applying for the rental
of a unit7 of property to be converted that a tentative map has been

filed.' Chapter 1098 requires that a subdivider provide specified
notice 9 to prospective tenants before the execution of the rental

for a condominium
agreement when a final map has been approved
1
project,'12 community apartment project,

project,

or a stock cooperative

DCHIV

Commission'sRegulationof New Developments,5 WfrTIER L. REv. 275 (1983) (discussing whether
an owner has a vested right to convert his property).
See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66452.8 (West 1983) (requiring notice, and providing the form
6.
and content requirements of notice).
7.
See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1350 (West Supp. 1992) (defining unit).
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 66452.8(a) (West 1983). The prospective tenant must be given notice
8.
of intent to convert 60 days before filing. Id.If the subdivider fails to give such notice, the subdivider

must pay to each prospective tenant who becomes a tenant and who is entitled to such notice, and
who does not purchase the unit, actual moving expenses under $500 and the tenant's first month's
rent under $500 for the tenant's new unit. Id. § 66452.8(c)(1)-(2) (West 1983); see generally
CALtFORNIA CONDOMINIUM AND PLANNED DEVELOPMENT PRACTICE § 4.15 at 300 (Cal. Continuing
Educ. Bar 1984 & Supp. 1992) (discussing the notice requirements of Government Code § 66452.8);
see id. § 2.27 at 81 (1984 & Supp. 1992) (discussing the special requirements for notice when
converting to a condominium). Existing law additionally affords the prospective tenant a right to
purchase the unit at the same price that is offered to the public for a period not less than 90 days.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66427.1 (West 1983). Compare iL § 66452.8 (West 1983) (listing notice
requirements) with OR. REV. STAT. § 100.305 (1991) (requiring subdivider to give each of the
existing tenants at least 120 days notice of the subdivider's plans to begin conversion process); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.8 (West 1987) (requiring the subdivider to give the tenants 60 days notice
of the intention to convert, a full plan of the conversion, and notification of their right to purchase).
See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66459(a) (enacted by Chapter 1098) (providing the proper form
9.
and contents for the notice of conversion). Chapter 1098 requires the notice to be printed in 14 point
and to include notification of the following: (1) The unit may be offered for sale to the public; (2)
the rental unit may be sold to the public, and if offered for sale, the lease may be terminated; (3) the
tenant will be notified 90 days before any offering to sell; and (4) the tenant will be given the first
chance to purchase the unit. I& § 66459(a) (enacted by Chapter 1098).
10.
See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1351(f) (West Supp. 1992) (defining condominium project).
11.
See i. § 1352(d) (West Supp. 1992) (defining community apartment project).
12.
CAL. GOv'T CODE § 66459(a)-(c) (enacted by Chapter 1098). This section applies to maps
approved on or after January 1, 1993. 1a § 66459(a) (enacted by Chapter 1098).
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Property; trusts and wills
Probate Code §§ 248, 248.5, 249, 8203, 13007, 13502.5,
21308 (new); §§ 1020, 1021, 1208, 2583, 3918, 6151, 10308,
10350, 10351, 12001, 15660, 16064, 16249, 17203
(amended).
AB 2975 (Horcher); 1992 STAT. Ch. 871
Prior law provided that a court had to consider specific issues1
before determining whether to authorize or require a conservator to
take any proposed action at the request of persons with an interest in
the trust.2 Chapter 871 provides that it is not mandatory that all of
these issues be considered before authorizing every proposed
action
Existing law provides that a decedent's intent to devise 4 an
interest to a designated person's heirs5 must be followed.6 Chapter
871 provides that unless a contrary intention is indicated by the will,
if the designated person's surviving spouse7 is living but remarried

1.
Id. § 2583(a)-(k) (amended by Chapter 871) (listing the I1 issues to be considered as: (1)
The legal capacity of the conservatee; (2) the past conduct of the conservatee; (3) the traits of the
conservatee; (4) the relationship between the conservatee and the prospective donees; (5) the wishes
of the conservatee; (6) any known estate plans of the conservatee; (7) the manner in which the estate
would devolve upon the conservatee's death; (8) the value of the estate; (9) the minimization of
current or future taxes and administrative costs; (10) any changes in the law that would probably have
motivated the conservatee to alter his estate plan; and (11) the probability, in view of all the
circumstances, that a reasonable conservatee would take the proposed action if he or she had the
ability to do so).
2.
1990 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 79, sec. 14, at 478 (West) (repealing and reenacting CAL. PROB.
CODE § 2583); see CAL. PROB. CODE § 2583 (amended by Chapter 871) (listing purposes for which
an interested person may petition court to force a conservator to take a proposed action). See
generallyRobert A. Briskin, A New Estate Planning Tool, 4 L.A. LwYER 28, 30-31 (Nov. 1981)
(explaining that using a durable power of attorney to alter estates appears to be contrary to the
mandates of California's Probate Code).
3.
CAL. PROB. CODE § 2583 (amended by Chapter 871).
4.
See id. § 32 (West 1991) (defining devise as the disposition of real or personal property
by will).
5.
See id. § 44 (West 1991) (defining heir as any person, including the surviving spouse, who
is entitled to take property of the decedent by intestate succession under the California Probate Code).
6.
Id. § 6151 (amended by Chapter 871).
7.
See id. § 78(a)-(d) (West 1991) (defining people who will not qualify as a surviving
spouse).
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at the time the devise is to take effect, the surviving spouse will
inherit nothing.!
Existing law provides that if a purchaser of real9 or personal1"
property fails to comply with the terms of the sale after a court has
confirmed it, the court may vacate the order confirming the sale.1 '
Chapter 871 provides that the court may also award damages to the
estate against the purchaser. 2
Existing law provides that a trustee13 does not have to give
information to a beneficiary 14 to the extent that a trust instrument 15
waives an accounting. 6 Chapter 871 provides that if it is reasonably
likely that a material breach 7 of a trust has occurred, the court may
force the trustee to account to the beneficiaries regardless of any
accounting waivers contained in the trust instrument."
8.
Id. § 6151 (amended by Chapter 871); see §§ 6401, 6402 (West 1991) (describing rights
of surviving spouse to decedent's property); UNiF. PROB. CODE § 2-711 (West Supp. 1992)
(containing the same provision which has now been added to § 6151 by Chapter 871); cf. In re
Everhart's Estate, 253 P.2d 174, 177 (Okla. 1953) (holding that although a remarried widow was
entitled to the devised property as an heir at law, she could not take it under her dead husband's will
since elsewhere he had excluded her from taking it if she remarried and because once she remarried
it was the moral duty of her new husband to care for her necessities); In re Scott's Estate, 90 Cal.
App. 2d 21, 23, 202 P.2d 357, 359 (1949) (holding that a widower's infidelity while married to his
wife did not prevent him from collecting his inheritance from her estate).
9.
See CAL. PROB. CODE § 68 (West 1991) (defining real property).
10.
See CAL Civ. CODE § 663 (West 1982) (defining personal property).
11.
CAL PROB. CODE § 10350(a) (amended by Chapter 871); see Barnes v. Morrison, 102
Cal. App. 152, 156-57,282 P. 986,988 (1929) (holding that a breaching buyer is liable for damages);
In re Long's Estate, 5 Cal. App. 684, 685-86, 91 P. 169, 170 (1907) (holding that the court has the
power to resell property after it has vacated a prior sale).
12.
CAL. PROB. CODE § 10350(a) (amended by Chapter 871).
13.
See id. § 84 (West 1991) (defining trustee).
14.
See id. § 24 (West 1991) (defining beneficiary).
15.
See id. § 45 (West 1991) (defining instrument).
16.
Id. § 16064(a) (amended by Chapter 871); see id. § 16062 (West 1991) (describing the
accounting duties of a trustee); id. § 17200 (West Supp. 1992) (granting beneficiaries and trustees
the right to petition the court concerning the internal affairs of a trust).
17.
See Brault v. Bigham, 493 S.W.2d 576, 578 (rex. Sup. Ct. 1973) (holding that a
defendant-trustee committed a material breach of a trust where she, as beneficiary of an insurance
policy whose proceeds were impressed with a trust for the benefit of her four minor grandchildren,
sought to use its proceeds for personal gain).
18.
CAL. PROB. CODE § 16064(a) (amended by Chapter 871); see Copley v. Copley, 126 Cal.
App. 3d 248, 289, 178 Cal. Rptr. 842, 867 (1981) (holding that hostility and antagonism can justify
an order of removal of a trustee when those emotions hamper the management of the trust);
Blackmon v. Hale, I Cal. 3d 548, 559-60,463 P.2d 418, 424-25, 83 Cal. Rptr. 194, 200-01 (1970)
(stating that trustees may open themselves to liability through negligent inattention to their
obligations, and must fully account to beneficiaries concerning any of their dealings with the trust
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Existing law grants trustees the power to prosecute actions for the
protection of trust property. 9 Chapter 871 provides that any person
who, in bad faith,2" has wrongfully taken trust property is liable for
twice the value of the property.21
Existing law provides that, with regard to an instrument
containing a no contest clause22 that has become irrevocable, a
beneficiary may ask the court to determine whether a particular act
by the beneficiary would be a contest.2" Chapter 871 provides that
the statute of limitations for commencement of an action by a
beneficiary to determine whether any act by him would be a contest
within the terms of the no contest clause, will be tolled from the date
of application until the date the court's determination becomes
24
fmal.
ACR
Property; untenantable dwellings
Civil Code § 1942.4 (amended); Code of Civil Procedure §
1174.2 (amended).
AB 2574 (Friedman); 1992 STAT. Ch. 488
property). The Blackmon court also stated that where trustees have been negligent in keeping the
accounts, all presumptions are against them. Id.
19.
CAL. PROB. CODE § 16249(a) (amended by Chapter 871); see Campbell v. Brich, 19 Cal.
2d 778, 793, 122 P.2d 902, 910 (1942) (holding that where a trustee was defrauded, the measure of
damages was equal to the amount of the loss due to the fraud).

20.

See CAL. PROB. CODE § 16440(b) (West 1991) (stating that a trustee's good faith breach

of trust can release him from partial or total liability for the losses incurred due to that breach).
21.
Id. § 16249(b) (amended by Chapter 871); see Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. v.
Talbot, 141 Cal. App. 2d 309, 322-23, 296 P.2d 848, 856-57 (1956) (stating that generally, damages
for the good faith mishandling of a trust are what was lost due to the mishandling, and for bad faith
errors the measure is what was lost plus interest, but above all the measure of damages depnds upon
the specific facts of the situation).
22.
See CAL. PROB. CODE § 21300(b) (West 1991) (defining no contest clause).
23.
Id. § 21320(a) (West 1991); see id. § 21300(a) (defining contest); In re Estate of Watson,
177 Cal. App. 3d 569, 572, 223 Cal. Rptr. 14, 16 (1986) (holding that merely because a legal action
results in the changing of a distribution of a will, it does not conclusively determine that a prohibited
contest has occurred).
24.
CAL. PROB. CODE § 2130g (enacted by Chapter 871).
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Existing law provides that any landlord' who demands or
collects rent from a tenant2 when substandard housing conditions3
exist will be liable to the tenant or lessee for actual damages 4
incurred as well as for special damages.5 Chapter 488 permits a court
that awards damages in a suit under section 1942.4 to order the
landlord to abate any nuisance6 and to repair any substandard
conditions at the rental dwelling which significantly or materially
affect the health or safety of the tenant.7
Under existing law, if during an unlawful detainer' action, the
court finds that there has been a substantial breach of the landlord's
obligations,9 the court is required to determine a reasonable rental

1.
See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 878 (6th ed. 1990) (defining landlord as an owner of an
estate in land, or a rental property, who has leased it to another person).
2.
See LmBEY F. JEssup, LANDLORD AND TENANT 122 (1974) (defining tenant as one who
has the temporary use and occupancy of real property owned by another, and the duration and terms
of that tenancy usually being fixed by a lease); see also CAL Civ. CODE § 1940(a),(b) (West 1985)
(defining persons who hire as tenants, lessees, boarders, lodgers, and others, however denominated,
except those who maintain transient occupancy in a hotel, motel, or residence club, or maintain
occupancy in a hotel or motel where the innkeeper retains a right of access to and control of the
dwelling, and provides specified services).
3.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1941.1 (West 1985) (providing the housing standards which must
be maintained for a dwelling to remain tenantable, including waterproofing and weatherproofing,
plumbing, hot and cold running water, heating, electricity, clean and sanitary building and grounds,
adequate refuse receptacles, and floors and stairways kept in good repair).
4.
See Beeman v. Burling, 216 Cal. App. 3d 1586, 1601, n.9, 265 Cal. Rptr. 719,728 (1990)
(defining actual damages as real, substantial, and just damages, or the amount awarded to a
complainant as compensation for his actual and real loss or injury).
5.
CAL. Ctv. CODE § 1942A(a) (amended by Chapter 488); see ad § 1942.4(a)(1)-(4)
(amended by Chapter 488) (providing the conditions that prompt liability to a tenant); Myers v.
Stephens, 233 Cal. App. 2d 104, 120-21, 43 Cal. Rptr. 420, 433 (1965) (defining special damages
as those that do not arise from the act itself, but depend on the circumstances peculiar to the
infliction of each respective injury). See generally DMAuEL B. DOBBS, REMDIES 138 (1973)
(discussing the differences between general and special damages).
6.
See CAL. CtV. CODE § 3479 (West 1970) (defining nuisance as an obstruction to the free
use of property so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property).
7.
i& § 1942A(c) (amended by Chapter 488).
8.
See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1161 (West 1982) (defining unlawful detainer as a tenant
remaining in possession, in person or by subtenant, after the expiration of the term for which the
property is let to the tenant).
9.
See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1941 (West 1985) (providing that a lessor of a building intended
for human occupation must, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, put it into a condition
fit for occupation, and repair all subsequent delapidations which render it untenantable).
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value for the premises in its untenantable state to the date of trial.t"
Chapter 488 permits the court to order the landlord to make repairs
and correct the substandard conditions, and requires the court to order
that the monthly rent be limited to the reasonable rental value of the
premises in its substandard condition until repairs are completed."
NCL
Property; wrongful occupation
Civil Code § 3334 (amended).
AB 2663 (Polanco); 1992 STAT. Ch. 469
Under existing law, damage caused by the wrongful occupation'
of real property is deemed to be the value of the use of the property
for the time of occupation and the costs of recovering possession of

10.
CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE § 1174.2(a)(1) (amended by Chapter 488); see CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1941 (West 1985) (specifying a landlord's obligations with respect to rented or leased property);
see also ROBERT S. ScHosHINsKi, AMEICAN LAw OF LANDLORD AND TENANT, §§ 3-16 to 3-29,

at 122-150 (1980) (discussing a landlord's obligations under the implied warranty of habitability).
See generally Norman Pine, Implied Warranty of Habitabilityas a Defense to Unlawful Detainer
Actions, 63 CAL. L. REV. 301 (1975) (discussing the use of the warranty of habitability in defending
against an unlawful detainer action brought by a landlord).
11.
CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 1174.2(a)(3),(4) (amended by Chapter 488); see Green v.
Superior Court., 10 Cal. 3d 616, 637-38, 517 P.2d 1168, 1183, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 719 (1974)
(holding that minor housing code violations do not affect habitability, and therefore are not
substantial enough to warrant a reduction in rent); Smith v. David, 120 Cal. App. 3d 101, 110, 176
Cal. Rptr. 112, 116-17 (1981) (holding that a landlord's failure to substantially comply with
applicable health and housing laws does not relieve the tenant from the total obligation to pay rent,
but rather allows the tenant to withhold rent payment until the defects are corrected or until there is
a judicial determination as to the fair rent owing to the landlord for the premises in their substandard
condition).

1.
See Haime v. DeBeaulieu, 20 Cal. 2d 849, 855, 129 P.2d 345, 348 (1942) (holding that
where a mortgage gives the mortgagee no right to possession of the property and the mortgagor does
not consent to the occupation, possession of the property by the mortgagee constitutes a wrongful
occupation); cf.City of Oakland v. Buteau, 219 Cal. 745,757,29 P.2d 177, 182 (1934) (holding that
where possession of the property was taken pursuant to a court order, the possession was not tortious
in any sense, and therefore no wrongful occupation existed).

1016

Pacific Law JournalVoL 24

Property

the property,2 providing that the damages do not exceed the value of
the use of the property for the five years preceding the
commencement of the action for wrongful occupation.' Chapter 469
expands the measure of damages for wrongful occupation to include

reasonable costs of repairing or restoring the property to its original
condition. 4 Chapter 469 defines the value of the use of the property
as the greater of either the benefits obtained by the wrongful
occupier, so long as the occupation was not by mistake of fact, 5 or
the rental value of the property,6 whichever is greater. 7 If the
wrongful occupation is the result of a mistake of fact, the value of the
use of the property shall be the reasonable rental value of the
property.8
SRM

2.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3334 (a) (amended by Chapter 469); cf MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-318
(1991); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-03-21 (1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 62 (West 1987);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-3-5 (1992) (providing similar damages for wrongful occupation of
real property).
3.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3334(a) (amended by Chapter 469).
4.
Id.
5.
See id. § 1577 (West 1982) (defining mistake of fact); see also White v. Berenda Mesa
Water Dist., 7 Cal. App. 3d 894, 907, 87 Cal. Rptr. 338, 347-48 (1970) (holding that it is the facts
surrounding the mistake and not the label 'mistake of fact' that is controlling).
6.
CAL Civ. CODE. § 3334 (amended by Chapter 469); see Sherman v. Associated Tel. Co.,
100 Cal. App. 2d 806, 808, 224 P.2d 846, 848 (1950) (holding that where a realty owner did not
allege or prove the reasonable value of the occupation of his property, he could not recover the
reasonable rental value).
7.
CAL Civ. CODE § 3334(b)(1) (amended by Chapter 469).
8.
Id. § 3334(b)(2) (amended by Chapter 469).
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